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In his excellent article, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?:  
The Debate Over Corporate Purpose, Professor Edward Rock articulates his 
understanding of the current debate over corporate purpose and surfaces four 
separate, but related, questions that he views as central to that debate: 
First, what is the best theory of the legal form we call 
“the corporation”?  Second, how should academic 
finance understand the properties of the legal form when 
building models or engaging in empirical research?  
Third, what are good management strategies for building 
valuable firms?  And, finally, what are the social roles 
and obligations of large publicly traded firms?1 
He argues that what he calls “populist pressures” have led contestants to the debate 
to confuse the separate questions he highlights.2  Professor Rock finishes by 
fearing that these populist pressures could bring about changes to long-standing 
principles of American corporate governance that would result in more harm than 
benefit. 
In this reply, I echo and applaud Professor Rock’s clear vision as to the 
current state of corporate law in the United States.  Professor Rock’s willingness to 
be accurate about the state of affairs that actually exists is admirable, and all too 
rare in a debate where many obscure what “is” to make it their “ought.”  I also 
                                                 
1 Edward B. Rock, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate Over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. 
LAW. (forthcoming Spring 2021) (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., Working Paper No. 515/2020; NYU Sch. L. Pub. L. 
Research Paper, Working Paper No. 20-16, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589951 [hereinafter “Rock”].  
2 Id. at 1. 
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admire Professor Rock’s willingness to shine a light on the academy, and its role in 
bringing us to where we are, and in particular its obsessive focus on equating the 
value of corporations to society with their expected value to those who hold their 
equity capital—that is, to their stockholders. 
Where I take issue with Professor Rock is that I do not source this debate to 
the business elites whom he credits with pushing society toward a more 
stakeholder-, and less stockholder-, focused conception of the corporate purpose.  
It may be that these business elites are confused about his four questions, but that 
is not fair to say of the advocates and scholars who have, for many years before 
these elites spoke a word about stakeholders, believed that our corporate 
governance system was out of whack and causing social harm. 
And Professor Rock’s four questions are themselves in some way a natural 
outgrowth of an elite academic culture that, as he admits, has largely looked at 
corporate governance through a monocular lens focused solely on stockholder 
welfare.  His first two questions are largely hobbyhorses of law and finance 
professors, while the third is the focus of business school courses.  These may be 
the lens through which law and economic elites look at the issue of corporate 
purpose, but they are far narrower than that of the general public affected by our 
corporate governance system. 
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Professor Rock’s last question gets closer to the mark about the real causes 
of the current debate; he suggests that those who have been driving the debate 
since its inception are concerned with the “social roles and obligations of publicly 
traded firms.”3  For sure, they are and have been. 
But, even then Rock’s prism is too narrow.  That elites like money managers 
and the Business Roundtable (“BRT”) are recognizing that things need to change is 
not because they have come to question the simplifying legal and finance models 
that professors use to understand corporate law or the outcomes the corporate 
governance system produces, nor is it because there are profound new insights into 
management technique, linking business performance to articulated purpose. 
Rather, they are doing so because the outcomes of a corporate governance 
system that has increased the power of stockholders, in the form of institutional 
investors, and decreased the power of workers and other corporate stakeholders are 
unsustainable, both in terms of their effect on the environment and on the social 
fabric.  And the debate is not narrowly focused on just public companies, but 
demanding more accountability from all societally influential private companies 
whose actions have contributed to these problems.  For at least 40 years, a strain of 
economic thinking, typically embraced by those who believe that society is best 
                                                 
3 Id. at 1. 
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served when corporations focus solely on making profits for stockholders, has 
increased the power of economic elites and gone to war against the regulatory state 
and externality protections put in place by the New Deal and Great Society to 
protect workers, consumers, the environment, and society generally. 
What has resulted is wage stagnation, growing inequality, climate change 
that threatens humanity, repeated bailouts by the many of the few, consumer 
exploitation, and increased insecurity, social division, and racial and economic 
inequality.  The late recognition of business elites that a corporate governance 
system contributing to such results needs reform was not the start of this debate; it 
was a signal that they knew that a long-standing debate threatened to come to a 
head and produce outcomes that they could not control. 
For decades now, there have been advocates and scholars bemoaning the tilt 
in our corporate governance system, and the effect that the embrace of Milton 
Friedman- and Ronald Reagan-style thinking has had on our economy’s basic 
fairness and sustainability.  It is the elites in business and in law and economics 
scholarship who are catching up.  They are not in the vanguard; they were slow on 
the uptake, and the questions being asked are more fundamental and involve this:  
Isn’t it time for all societally important business entities—not just public 
companies, but large private companies and money management firms as well—to 
have to use their power in a socially responsible manner?  And if the current power 
 
5 
 
allocation lets economic elites use corporate power to decrease the effectiveness of 
the political process to protect corporate stakeholders, isn’t it necessary to address 
the power and purpose dynamics within corporate governance itself so that they 
align better with the outcomes we want for our society’s well-being and equity? 
In my view, the answer to both questions is yes, and I further believe that the 
most promising proposals to move our corporate governance system in a positive 
direction do not involve a dangerous revolution.  Instead, they involve a restoration 
of balance that takes into account the different market, political, and resulting 
power dynamics that exist in the 21st century and that would move the American 
system of corporate governance into greater harmony with systems that exist in 
many high-functioning market economies that compete effectively in the global 
markets while producing better outcomes for the many. 
Inaction and failure to take sensible steps forward is the real danger now, 
and those stuck in a tired debate between what version of elite corporate rule 
should prevail are the ones who are confused and risk social upset.  With clear 
eyes, sound consciences, and stiff spines, we have the capacity to make the 
American corporate governance system evolve in a productive way.  It is the 
failure to admit that the current model is as Professor Rock describes, and to go 
further than he will and admit that it needs an overhaul to fit a 21st century 
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economy, which long ago outgrew its ability to function fairly for the many, that is 
endangering not just our economy, but the ties that bind us together as Americans. 
I. Roadmap 
In considering how to reply to Professor Rock’s richly textured essay, it was 
tempting to simply track his sections and comment upon his dilation of each of the 
four questions he considers central to the current conversation about corporate 
purpose.  But after reading his article repeatedly, I decided to take a different 
approach.  There are two primary reasons for that.  The first is that Professor 
Rock’s characterization of the legal state of affairs and the predominant elite 
academic take on the debate is characteristically measured, and I find far more to 
agree with than to disagree.  For the reader, therefore, an approach that simply 
bought into his framework and considered the four questions he does as primary 
would not be interesting.  Second, and more importantly, by taking a different 
approach, I hope to identify some perspectives on the debate that supplement 
Professor Rock’s and to give readers some other ways of thinking about how we 
got to where we are. 
In particular, I wish to highlight the different way in which I see the origins 
and the debate and the central questions our society faces about the purpose of 
corporations, and of corporate governance more generally. 
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To do that, I proceed this way.  First, I address Professor Rock’s accurate 
and balanced discussion of how the dominant corporate law in the United States—
that of the State of Delaware—addresses corporate purpose, and how other 
models—including those in constituency states and under public benefit 
corporation (“PBC”) statutes—do.4  This is important to the public policy 
discussion, because, for far too long, too much time has been wasted in arguments 
not grounded in reality about corporate law, instead of arguing about the real issue, 
which is:  whether and how that reality should change. 
From there, I pivot to discussing the reasons why I do not find the four 
questions Professor Rock identifies to be as central as he sees them to the public 
debate over corporate purpose.  In particular, I highlight ways in which the 
questions themselves tend to perpetuate the viewpoint of academics who have 
looked at the question of corporate purpose through a very narrow, and 
stockholder-focused, lens. 
I then move from the issue of legal and market reality to addressing 
Professor Rock’s view of the origins of the immediate controversy.  In doing so, I 
note my view that Professor Rock has confused the elite’s late-arriving recognition 
                                                 
4 I do not burden the reader with a discussion of Professor Rock’s discussion of how constituency statutes operate, 
or his recognition of the emerging public benefit corporation model.  That discussion is equally balanced, and it is 
not as subject to the same attempts at confusion that characterize the debate about what Delaware corporate law says 
about corporate purpose. 
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of the debate—a symptom—with the actual forces that have brought it about.  I 
argue that it is important to be clear about why the debate is occurring, if the 
outcome of it is to be productive, and if it is not just to descend into small 
arguments among the “haves” about just how little change the establishment can 
get away with while remaining the establishment. 
I turn from there to a discussion of the blinkered way in which many key 
contestants to the debate are proceeding, by highlighting two key techniques used 
by traditional corporate law that are not stressed by Professor Rock and that have 
relevance to the policy debate.  These techniques are:  i) the use of the business 
judgment rule to give directors and management more space to be other–regarding 
toward stakeholders other than stockholders; and ii) the importance of normative 
obligations imposed on directors, even when those obligations are not enforceable 
by way of money damages.  In highlighting these successful techniques, I suggest 
that some of the pending policy proposals to move corporate law in a more 
stakeholder-focused direction have more promise than left-wing skeptics think, and 
pose less of a threat to traditional corporate law efficiency than Professor Rock or 
more conservative commentators fear. 
Finally, I finish by expanding on the same themes, and by differing with 
Professor Rock to the extent that he contends that adhering to the status quo is less 
risky than adapting our system of corporate law in an evolutionary way to address  
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the needs of a 21st century market economy, in which the power dynamics are 
markedly different than in the post-war era during which American capitalism 
functioned most effectively for the many.  By evolutionary means, which build on 
current techniques of corporate law, and that restore the regulatory framework 
within which corporate power used to be exercised, we can build a sounder basis 
for sustainable prosperity and greater social unity, because we will create 
incentives for our economy to more fairly share its gains with the workers whose 
hard work and innovation is primarily responsible for creating them.  And we can 
also better align our corporate governance system with the interests of humanity in 
ensuring that in trying to build wealth, we do not destroy the planet, injure  
consumers, or otherwise cause more harm than good. 
 
II. Getting Real About Revlon: Professor Rock’s Accurate Description of 
American Corporate Law  
 
One of the most refreshing aspects of Professor Rock’s article is its balanced 
and accurate statement of what Delaware corporate law says about the means and 
ends of corporate governance.  Great fiction is part of what makes human life 
worth living, but obscurantism and deception about what the law is undermines the 
ability of society to make good decisions about how the law should evolve. 
As Professor Rock explains, the rule in Delaware is plain:  corporate 
fiduciaries may take actions benefiting other corporate stakeholders so long as 
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there are “rationally relat[ing] benefits” to the stockholders, as famously expressed 
in the Delaware Supreme Court case Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.5  This rational relationship test is the general rule and not a rule that 
applies in only one situation. 
Those who say that portion of Revlon is dictum or does not state the general 
rule of Delaware law do not understand what it means for something to be essential 
to the resolution of the case.6  In fact, it is not clear to me that they have ever read 
the full case.  For starters, they ignore the fact that no constituency could have been 
more sympathetic to a stockholder primacy advocate than the Revlon noteholders.  
Why?  Because they had gotten their notes weeks before the end stages of the 
bidding contest for Revlon, when they were advised by the board that it was in 
                                                 
5 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (“Moreover, while concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when 
addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by the requirement that there be some rationally related benefit 
accruing to the stockholders.”). 
6 As a judge for 21 years, I had to deal with the reality of Revlon as precedent, and as a professor during the same 
period at Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania Law Schools, I always had my students read the full series of 
cases running from Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) to Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC, 637 A.2d 34 
(Del. 1994), in more or less full form, with especial emphasis on Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946 (Del. 1985) and Revlon.  Early in this century, I explained in full the difficulties I perceived that Revlon caused 
for the ability of boards to protect other stakeholders.  Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Board of 
Directors and Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions: Is There Any ‘There’ There?, 75 U.S.C. L. REV. 
1167 (2002).  Others have argued the same.  See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for 
Shareholder Primacy, 75 U.S.C. L. REV. 1189, 1197–99, 1205–07 (2002) (arguing that Revlon is bad for diversified 
investors as a class because a rule allowing stockholders to cash out and ignore the interests of other stakeholders 
discourages prior-period firm-specific investments by those stakeholders to the detriment of overall value creation 
by corporations). 
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their interests as stockholders to exchange some of their shares for notes, and that 
the value of the notes would be protected by the independent directors.7 
So when the Revlon board argued that it was favoring the bidder that would 
provide the best price for stockholders while protecting the value of the notes, the 
board knew that many Revlon stockholders now had a Revlon portfolio consisting 
of both stock and notes, and that they only owned the notes because the board 
encouraged them to accept them on the promise of value protection.  After the 
statement by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal that boards might have the 
discretion to give stakeholder interests equal weight in mergers and acquisitions 
(“M&A”),8 no doubt the Revlon board and its legal advisors thought they were on 
solid legal ground in arguing that fairness to noteholders could be taken into 
account in their decision-making. 
But, as we know, the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon firmly rejected that 
idea.  And its reasoning was clear, whether one agrees with it or not.  Because the 
Revlon board was selling the company for cash, it was the final opportunity for 
stockholders to profit from their investment.  That being so, there was no way that 
protecting the value of the notes could have a rational relationship to the best 
                                                 
7 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. 
8 Unocal, 493 A.2d. at 955 (suggesting that a board could reject a takeover bid based on its “impact on 
‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (that is, creditors, customers, employees and perhaps even the community 
generally”)). 
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interests of stockholders, and thus the board was breaching its fiduciary duty of 
loyalty by preferring the interests of the noteholders to those of the stockholders.9 
This rational relationship test was in no way incidental to the holding—it 
was crucial.  Had Revlon been selling a division to which the value of the notes 
were tied, a decision to accept a bid that protected the value of the notes could have 
been rationalized on the ground that it would benefit stockholders in the future, as 
the company would likely need debt financing, and thus it would benefit 
stockholders for the company to maintain a reputation for treating its noteholders 
well since that would help the company get favorable financing terms in the future.  
But because Revlon was selling the entire company, and there was no tomorrow, 
the generally forgiving rational relationship test could not be satisfied, and the 
board lost.10 
                                                 
9 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
10 Id. at 182-83.  Admittedly, there is a different way to understand Revlon:  that the board did not even-handedly 
deal with both bidders for the benefit of the stockholders and noteholders, but instead locked up a deal with 
Forstmann because of the antipathy its management and board had toward Ronald Perelman.  Id. at 175 (noting the 
Revlon’s CEO “strong personal antipathy” for Perelman).  But it would have been easy to write the decision in that 
way without relying on the need in a sale—because of the lack of a relationship between noteholder and stockholder 
welfare—to focus solely on stockholders, and the Court’s holding hinged on that reasoning.  
Folks who give short shrift to Revlon often fail to cite to the Delaware Supreme Court’s own statement that it 
viewed itself as addressing for the “first time the extent to which a corporation may consider the interests of 
constituencies other than shareholders,” to which it gave a clear answer:  “while concern for various constituencies 
is proper when addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by the requirement that there be some rationally 
relating benefits accruing to the stockholders.”  506 A.2d at 176. 
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Say what you will about the rational relationship test, but don’t say it’s 
dictum.11  The reason why the movement for anti-takeover and constituency 
statutes took on so much prominence is because critics of Revlon, like Marty 
Lipton, knew that the Delaware Supreme Court had rejected giving boards the 
discretion to treat stockholders as just one among many equal stakeholders, and 
had done so in a way that substantially limited the ability of boards to protect 
stakeholders at a critical point in time to them:  when the business will go under 
the control of new management. 
Relatedly, Professor Rock also makes clear that his understanding of the 
Delaware general rule is not idiosyncratic.12  He grounds his view in the governing 
source of corporate law and its stockholder-focused power framework, the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), showing that it grants rights only 
to stockholders and is written to protect their interests.  Rock then shows how the 
                                                 
11 In earlier work, I addressed this issue at more length, and cited and addressed the arguments of the many scholars 
who claim that Delaware’s common law of corporation law is ambiguous on this issue of purpose, and also 
underscored the critical importance of the Delaware General Corporation Law’s power structure in understanding 
Delaware law.  See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need For a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the 
Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 477 (2015). 
12 Because he is focused on Delaware common and statutory law, Professor Rock does not cite distinguished 
scholars like Robert Clark, Stephen Bainbridge, Jonathan Macey, Mark Roe, and Roberta Romano, who take a 
similar view to his of what traditional corporate law’s view of corporate purpose is.  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate 
Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding “We the People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 
HARV. C.R.– CIV. LIBERTY L. REV. 423, 440 n.63 (2016) (citing each scholar’s views to this effect).  For another 
recent article addressing the debate within academia about corporate purpose with clarity, see Mark J. Loewenstein 
& Jay Geyer, Shareholder Primacy and the Moral Obligation of Directors (U. Colorado L. Legal Stud., Research 
Paper No. 20-52, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3689979 (2020). 
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Delaware judiciary has understood that statute.  If you don’t agree with Vice 
Chancellor Laster’s view,13 he directs you to Chancellor Chandler.14  If you don’t 
agree with Chancellor Chandler, he points you to Chancellor Allen.15  If you don’t 
agree with the Court of Chancery, there is a unanimous decision of the Delaware 
Supreme Court to the same effect.16  These distinguished judges had very different 
judicial approaches and writing styles, but they all agree on what Delaware law 
means.17   
If observers would like Delaware law to be different than it is, then it is time 
for them to acknowledge reality and to do the hard work to advocate amendments 
to the DGCL to make it as they wish it was.  That is what the advocates of the 
Delaware PBC statute did when they passed a law giving corporations the option to 
                                                 
13 In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3D 17, 40–41 (Del. Ch. 2013) (V.C. Laster) (“[T]he duty of loyalty . . . 
mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of stockholders.”); 
see also In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holder Litig., 88 A.3D 54, 80 (Del. Ch. 2014) (same). 
14 Rock, supra note 1, at 8 (citing eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.2d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (V.C. 
Chandler)). 
15 Rock, supra note 1, at 8 (citing TW Services, Inc. S’holder Litig., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
2, 1989) (V.C. Allen)); see also Paramount v. Time, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *22 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) 
(V.C. Allen) (noting the board has a “duty to seek to maximize in the long run financial returns to the corporation 
and its shareholders”), aff’d, 571 A.2d. 1140 (Del. 1989) (V.C. Allen); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 
(Del. Ch. 1987) (V.C. Allen). 
16 N. American Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 100 (Del. 2007). 
17 It should not be forgotten in this discussion that many stockholder primacy advocates were upset that Delaware 
did not embrace their “means” argument in cases like Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 
(Del. 1989) (giving a strong hand to directors to reject takeover bids and issuing dictum harshly criticizing the ruling 
in City Cap. Assoc. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) that put limits on the ability of a board 
to use a pill to block a non-coercive bid permanently), that stockholders should be able to dictate what is best for 
them in mergers and acquisitions, and not be subject to fiduciary blocks on their ability to sell.  This “means” debate 
has often confused the debate about the “ends,” as scholars like Stephen Bainbridge have shown.  See Stephen 
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 N.W. L. REV. 547, 547–52 (2003). 
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embrace a mandatory stakeholder model of governance.  If the managerialists who 
prefer a general “may” regime such as exists in constituency states want to 
overrule the rational relationship rule of Delaware law, they must do so, as has 
happened in 33 other states.18  Professor Rock does a service by putting paid to 
those who continue to obscure the reality of what Delaware law is, and thereby to, 
intentionally or unintentionally, impede making progress on what that law could 
be. 
III. Professors and Their Models:  The Real World Consequences of 
Ignoring the Way the Real World Works 
As someone who has spent a lot of time around corporate law and finance 
scholars during the last quarter century, it is not surprising that Professor Rock 
views the current debate as centering around these questions: 
First, what is the best theory of the legal form we call 
“the corporation”?  Second, how should academic 
finance understand the properties of the legal form when 
building models or engaging in empirical research?  
Third, what are good management strategies for building 
valuable firms?  And, finally, what are the social roles 
and obligations of large publicly traded firms?19 
                                                 
18 Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (finding 33 states with constituency statutes in force during the period from 2000 to 2019).  An 
additional 38 states, including the District of Columbia, have passed PBC legislation.  WHY PASS BENEFIT 
CORPORATION LEGISLATION, BENEFIT CORPORATION, https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/why-pass-benefit-
corporation-legislation. 
19 Rock, supra note 1, at 1. 
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I find these questions unintentionally revealing, especially in an article that 
is in many ways refreshingly clear of academic cant.  The first question, by way of 
example, seems one that only professors would put the way Professor Rock does.   
Most statute writers and policy makers do not think about the best theory in that 
verbiage; those who are focused on the right thing—positive and fair public 
policy—think about what structure of regulation or governance will produce the 
most socially desirable outcome.  In this domain, my sense is that the real-world 
participants to the debate divide on this basic question:  is it better for society if 
corporations focus solely or mostly on making profits for stockholders?  Or should 
corporations focus in equal measure on treating all their stakeholders with respect?  
From this, they then proceed, or should, to more instrumental questions, such as 
what allocation of powers to various corporate stakeholders best facilitates their 
view of the good?  In this calculus, I dare say most drafters of corporate law 
statutes have had little regard for late-arriving theories like “nexus of contracts” or 
the “associational model.”20  They have historically drawn analogies to techniques 
of direct and republican democracy to channel the exercise of corporate power.21 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (setting forth nexus of contracts theory of the firm). 
21 Some scholars resist this notion.  The scholarship of Nikolas Bowie undermines their position.  See generally 
Nikolas Bowie, Corporate Personhood v. Corporate Statehood, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (2019) (reviewing ADAM 
WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018)) (describing the 
connection between the charters of colonies and corporations, and how their development has been influenced by 
political philosophy).  Interestingly, those who do so often find an article written by Michael Jensen and William 
Meckling in the year of the bicentennial a source of inspiration and novel insight.  See Michael C. Jensen & William 
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
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Likewise, Professor Rock’s second question—“how should academic 
finance understand the properties of the legal form when building models or 
engaging in empirical research”—is one specific to law and economic scholars, not 
policy makers.  But that question and the third—what are good management 
strategies for building valuable firms—underscore just how influential academic 
framing can be in skewing not only academic thought itself, but public policy.  The 
second question, for example, uses the “properties of the legal form” as a building 
block for how finance professors should think about the value of corporations.  But 
if that means that finance professors should assume, by way of example, that what 
is important in valuing firms is only their value to the holders of their equity, then 
the model they build will tend to reflect that.  Similarly, if the value of the firm to 
society is equated with solely its value to stockholders, that will affect what is a 
“valuable firm” and what management strategies best create them.22 
To this point, one of the most interesting parts of Professor Rock’s paper 
was his discussion of how elite finance professors and their law school 
                                                 
305 (1976).  This article is, in essence, a recitation of how, with the right use of checks and balances, disaggregated 
investors can productively entrust their capital to centralized management.  This was the same problem that the 
Federalist Papers and that thinkers like John Locke and Henri Montesquieu had pondered in forming a national 
government, and corporate law statutes employ many of their same tools. 
22 In another paper, Professor Rock focuses more deeply on the connection between business purpose and firm 
outcomes, and cites scholars such as Claudine Gartenberg, Andrea Prat, and George Serafeim, who show that 
purpose-driven companies create more value by focusing on stockholder-focused metrics, like return on assets and 
Tobin’s Q.  Edward B. Rock, Business Purpose and the Objective of the Corporation (NYU L. & Econ. Research 
Paper, No. 20-44, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3724710. 
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counterparts look at the value of corporations.  Professor Rock persuasively shows 
that the predominant way to measure the value of a corporation to society is just to 
figure out the value at which its equity will sell.  Even more sophisticated metrics 
than just current stock price, such as Tobin’s Q, ultimately focus on figuring out a 
proxy for the value of a company to just one constituency—stockholders.23 
Another way that these measures have historically affected the debate about 
corporate purpose is not discussed by Professor Rock, but his incisive essay alludes 
to it.  In discussing his third question about the relationship of purpose to corporate 
value in a related essay, Rock cites literature that attempts to show that 
corporations with a clear purpose beyond just profit—some mission of making the 
world a better place, if only by the quality of the products or services sold—are 
more valuable.24  But the measures of values used are ones traditionally associated 
with stockholder value.  This method of measuring value has long had a distorting 
effect on the purpose debate.  As far back as Marty Lipton’s iconic Takeover Bids 
in the Target’s Boardroom article,25 advocates of stakeholder governance have 
tried to show that their view of the world is actually better, not just to diversified 
investors, but to a hypothetical stockholder who is long just the particular company 
                                                 
23 Rock, supra note 1, at 17. 
24 See Rock, supra note 1, at 20–23. 
25 Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 108 (1979) (explaining that 
“shareholders have profited in the overwhelming majority of defeated takeovers”). 
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that is subject to a takeover or an activist campaign.  They do so by trying to show 
that takeover bids and activism were not associated with higher firm values based 
on metrics solely addressing stock price over some time horizon.26  As some of the 
scholarship Rock averts to in the debate about corporate purpose and value 
illustrates, this essential framing of the debate continues, with the fight being over 
whether a focus on short-term stock price maximization is likely to foster or harm 
long-term value creation.27  But even this framing necessarily tilts the debate by 
making advocates of stakeholder governance play uphill and against the wind.  
Even from the standpoint of stockholders, a focus solely on one target company’s 
fate, rather than the effect of corporate governance rules on overall outcomes 
                                                 
26 In prior work, I collected abundant citations to scholars on both sides of the debate on the question of whether 
activism increased or decreased firm value, almost of all which use share price or share price proxies for that 
purpose.  See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge 
Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1938-42  (2017); Strine, The 
Dangers of Denial, supra note 11, at 787 n.102 (collecting scholarly articles on this and related subjects, such as 
whether “say on pay” increases shareholder value). 
 
Some scholars have even tried to analyze whether corporate governance changes proposed by policy makers, such as 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s proxy access proposals, or made by judicial decisions, such as Airgas, Inc. 
v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1194-95 (Del. 2010), were good for stockholders by doing event studies 
about the correlation of the stock market to those decisions.  See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Measurement Issues in 
the Proxy Access Debate (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Gov. Stanford U., Working Paper No. 71; Stanford U. L. Sch. L. & 
Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 392, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1538630 
(discussing empirical data indicating that the SEC’s proxy access proposal reduced shareholder wealth); Bo Becker, 
Daniel Bergstresser, & Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from 
the Business Roundtable’s Challenge, 56 J.L. & ECON. 127 (2013) (same); Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How 
Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value?: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627, 628–
35 (2013) (finding that the Chancery Court’s decision in Airgas, upholding a shareholder-initiated bylaw 
amendment to accelerate the date of the next annual shareholder meeting and thus shorten the terms of staggered 
directors, positively impacted firm value, while the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision reversing course negatively 
impacted firm value); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 
(2005) (finding that staggered boards are associated with lower firm value). 
27 Rock, supra note 1, at 20. 
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relevant to investors, is wrongheaded.  For diversified investors, the system that is 
most beneficial is the one that produces the most sustainable growth in stock value, 
net of externalities they must bear.28  Profits at one company, because it received a 
premium, may not matter if the buyer was another company whose stock the 
stockholder also held, and if the combined companies then struggle with excessive 
debt or because the combination did not make sense.  And of course, most 
investors do not own just stock—they also hold debt as a substantial portion of 
their portfolio, and governance rules that promote equity value at the expense of 
debt holders may at best involve a value shift, and worse.29  Put simply, simplified 
models that are based on the assumption that a corporation’s value can be equated 
with its equity value distort good thinking about corporate governance.30 
Further to this point, Professor Rock gives a bit less prominence to an 
accompanying assumption that many of the scholars who do this use to salve their 
                                                 
28 For an emerging voice’s incisive perspective on this, see Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 
95 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2020). 
29 Strine, Wolves, supra note 26, at 1938–42 (collecting studies suggesting that gains to stockholders from activism 
do not result from increases in firm value but transfers of value away from workers and creditors to stockholders, 
and that activism may lead to decreased R&D spending). 
30 This is why Professors Hart and Zingales, cited by Professor Rock, propose that companies focus on making 
decisions maximizing the overall welfare of presumably diversified investors.  Rock, supra note 1, at 18 (citing 
Oliver Hart & Luis Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J. L. FIN. & 
ACCT. 247 (2017)). 
 
Similarly, for an excellent article arguing that pension fund trustees should not only be allowed but required to 
consider the broader economic interests of their fund beneficiaries in key issues, such as preserving their jobs, in 
governing the fund, see David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 NYU L. REV. 2106 (2014). 
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consciences, and to silence the noise from their brain that screams the obvious:  the 
value of a corporation cannot be reduced to just the price its equity would sell for.  
That moral balm comes out of the residual claimant theory.  A simpler intellectual 
compound has perhaps never been conceived.  It rests on the idea that as a matter 
of law, creditors get paid before stockholders.  For stockholders to profit, all 
creditors must be satisfied.  Therefore, if we run corporations in a way that 
maximizes the surplus for stockholders, that will be best for the world, because all 
other corporate claimants will get their just desserts, and by seeking to grow the pie 
to benefit stockholders, the maximum social benefit will result.31 
That not much of this is close to true has not mattered much in turning 
scholars toward the more complex inquiries that are necessary to measure the real-
world value of and, just as important, the costs imposed on society by specific 
firms.  If the way the world worked was that stockholders could harvest every ten 
to twenty years, perhaps the residual claimant theory would have some power.  In 
that kind of summing-up, workers who had relied upon corporate promises and had 
made sacrifices would be treated fairly and get their due.  Communities that gave 
                                                 
31 For a good description of the basic argument for this perspective, see William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic 
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 269–70 (1992).  For a succinct takedown of the 
residual claimant model, see Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, supra note 6, 
at 1192–95.  For other incisive takedowns of the residual claimant model, particularly from the perspective of 
whether stockholders are more exposed to risk than workers as residual claimants, see Kent Greenfield, The Place of 
Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 302–11 (1998); William Lazonick, Labor in the 21st Century 32–
33 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 4, 2015). 
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tax subsidies and other benefits to companies would get repaid for broken 
promises, or have the corporation be forced to honor them.  Creditors who got 
short shrift would get trued up.  Consumers who were injured would get 
compensated.  Environmental damage would be remediated.  Only then would the 
stockholders feed. 
But that is not the way the world works.  Diversified stockholders in fact 
bear less firm-specific risk than most other stakeholders, particularly corporate 
workers, small creditors, pensioners, and corporate communities who cannot 
diversify away the risk of getting shafted.  And stockholders take all the time.  
They take when M&A and other activist-driven events occur.  They take when 
they benefit from dividends and buybacks.  And after these events, the 
corporations involved have not infrequently gone insolvent, downsized due to 
excessive leverage, shirked pension plans at the expense of pensioners and 
taxpayers, left communities out substantial tax dollars and without the benefits 
they were promised for forsaking them, and caused environmental and consumer 
harm that is not fully remediated. 
To be fair to my friend Professor Rock, he mostly averts to the academic 
models to say that they reflect an insight into what elite finance scholars believe is 
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the purpose of for-profit corporations.32  Because their models all focus on 
stockholder value, he rightly argues that this suggests that they believe the purpose 
of corporations is primarily to benefit stockholders.33 
But Professor Rock’s acknowledgment that ideas and ideology matter34 also 
suggests that the unthinking perpetuation of these models has itself contributed to a 
mistaken approach to corporate governance that embraced the idea that making 
companies more and more responsive to stockholders was a good thing.  If 
something had the effect of durably raising stock prices, then it must have been 
positive.35 
Lost in this, of course, is the reality that the measure of a company’s equity 
value just comprises the collective view of traders as to what they can extract as 
stockholders from a company.  If the workers of a company can be squeezed 
successfully, so that there is more for its stockholders, then the equity value goes 
up.  If a company’s environmental compliance is less costly and effective than 
other competitors and tolerated by local regulators in its pockets, its equity value 
                                                 
32 Rock, supra note 1, at 17–19. 
33 Id. at 15–19. 
34 Id. at 22. 
35 Admittedly Professor Rock says that the question for finance scholars “is how firms are actually managed” and 
that their measures assume that the answer to that question is for the benefit of stockholders.  Id. at 18.  But 
Professor Rock’s framing question is larger, and equating firm value solely with the value to stockholders is 
problematic not just normatively, but as an accurate description of economic reality. 
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can go up.36  The reason is simple:  what the market is measuring is simply what 
traders think stockholders can get out of investing. 
That narrow measure has no compelling relationship to the overall value that 
a corporation provides to society.  A company that provides a six percent return to 
equity, but that employs 10,000 workers at fair wages and in safe conditions in all 
its global operations, uses only contractors who do the same, and creates no 
externalities may well provide more value to society than an industry competitor 
that provides a nine percent return to equity, but employs far fewer workers 
directly and at much lower wages, that relies on even lower paid contracted labor, 
takes few safety protections, and generates externalities such as consumer and 
environmental harm.  Companies can be very competitive in product markets, but 
decide how to use the proceeds in a way that is much more distributionally useful 
to society and creates real economic value.  And companies can and often have 
done the opposite, yet the increased value of their equity does not get discounted 
for the harm done, because the stock market does not care about that—at least until 
the company gets caught and there is some short-term sell-off.  Importantly, 
because corporate power has been used to undermine the regulatory protections for 
                                                 
36 E.g., Roy Shapira & Luigi Zingales, Is Pollution Value-Maximizing?  The DuPont Case (Nat’l Bureau Econ. 
Rsch., Working Paper No. w23866, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3046380 (showing 
that it can be valuable for stockholders for companies to pollute and create harm if the expected gains outweigh the 
probability of regulatory detection and action sufficient to strip the company of its gains from improper conduct). 
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stakeholders, the probability that corporate wrongdoing will be punished in a way 
that makes overreaching more harmful to stockholders than beneficial to them has 
diminished.  In sum, equity value prices this lack of stakeholder protection as a 
positive, not a negative. 
The overall corrosion of this obsession with equity value is also 
underestimated.  By measuring value in a cramped manner that does not take into 
account important elements of real economic value to society—providing workers 
with the ability to live decent lives and with the financial resources to spend on 
goods and services that in turn produce more growth—and that does not take into 
account costs—externalities imposed on taxpayers, workers, consumers, and 
diversified investors—these models create a collective incentive for more 
responsible companies to be more callous to workers, consumers, creditors, the 
environment, and their communities so that they can compete with companies all 
too happy to please the stock market by shorting stakeholders and taking 
regulatory shortcuts. 
Not only that, but the single-minded focus on company-specific equity value 
obscures the question of whether the sum total of each company’s rent-seeking is a 
gain or drag on overall economic growth and social welfare.  The sum total of 
stockholder gains resulting from corporate externalities is not a gain in societal 
wealth; it is a shift of ill-gotten gains to stockholders.  And because stockholders 
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are much wealthier than average, this involves an unfair shifting of money from 
those who have less to those who have more.  And it fundamentally involves 
diverting societal resources that could do greater good to remediating corporate 
harm, or leaving the injured to take care of their own wounds.  Furthermore, the 
more companies can generate profits by shorting stakeholders and skirting the law, 
the less they are driven to improve their products and services in a way that creates 
the potential for a more prosperous society.  A society where corporate rent-
seeking instead of ingenuity becomes more prevalent faces, as Professor Coates so 
rightly calls out, the risk of becoming Russia.37  Models that simplify away 
anything but what stockholders expect to receive increase that risk, and the current 
societal debate about the purpose of the corporation is a rebellion in at least some 
meaningful part against the failure of elite academics to evolve their models to take 
into account the real world.  The strong push for companies to disclose more 
information about employee, environmental, social and governance (“EESG”) 
factors is just one manifestation of dissatisfaction with the equity value proxy. 
Finally, the reasons to be suspicious of equity value as a proxy for overall 
value have grown considerably.  With advances in technology and globalizing 
                                                 
37 John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment:  History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. 
COMMENT. 223, 224 (2015).  Professor Coates sums up the corporate rent-seeking race nicely, worrying that the 
concerted efforts of big corporations to tilt the regulatory system in a direction that serves their selfish interests 
“risks economic harms—a package of risks one could call (with some but only some exaggeration) ‘the risk of 
Russia.’”  Id.  In other words, it leads to a crony capitalism that lacks fairness, integrity, and dynamism. 
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markets, the prosperity of a company, its top managers, and its stockholders need 
not coincide with gains in employment in its headquarters community, an 
expansion of its worldwide direct workforce, or other positive externalities such as 
increases in its charitable giving.  Instead, it can involve huge gains for a small 
number of key employees, a large market cap, and the company’s conducting its 
business through contracted labor lacking the wages, benefits, and conditions of 
employment we would want our children and grandchildren to receive.  
Corporations not only often have no local identity; they have even been willing to 
abandon their nations in tax-avoiding inversions.  If more people are unwilling to 
indulge the idea that the “value” of these socially important institutions can be 
summed up in their stock price, they have good reason. 
IV. The Sources of the Current Debate:  The Justifiable Concerns and 
Discontent of the Many, Not the Late-Coming Recognition of Elites 
That Things Must Change 
One of my only genuine quibbles with Professor Rock’s incisive essay is his 
sourcing of the current debate over the purpose of corporations in our society to 
late-arising symptoms of long-simmering discontent.  To trace this debate to 
statements by the head of a huge money management firm and the Business 
Roundtable38 is like tracing the American Revolution to Cornwallis’s surrender and 
                                                 
38 Rock, supra note 1, at 2 (tracing the current debate to statements by Larry Fink, the head of the investment 
management firm BlackRock, and the Business Roundtable, in 2018 and 2019 respectively). 
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the ceding of the colonies by George III.  In fact, John Adams said it was a mistake 
to say the American Revolution started even at the much earlier skirmish at  
Lexington and Concord, tracing it to the prior acts of civil resistance that preceded 
the start of formal warfare.39  When representatives of the very business elites who 
have been the winners of the redistribution signal their recognition from the 
working many to the “haves” that our corporate governance system is broken, that 
is not the start of something; it is the signal that the simmer is threatening to boil 
over.  Before an establishment gets burned, its wiser and more enlightened leaders 
often speak up to push for a rebalancing that largely preserves the existing order 
and ameliorates the conditions that have given rise to widespread discontent.  In 
my view, that is what the statements of the Business Roundtable and money 
managers like BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard signal:  a recognition that an 
economic system that is so skewed toward the few will not continue to be tolerated 
by the many. 
As a matter of fair attribution, I would have liked to see Professor Rock 
credit not these late-arriving elites, but rather the many activists and scholars who 
came to this view and acted on it before it was popular to do so.  Within the 
                                                 
39 From John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818, FOUNDERS ONLINE, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6854 (“The Revolution was effected before the War 
commenced.  The Revolution was in the Minds and Hearts of the People.  A Change in their Religious Sentiments of 
their Duties and Obligations.”).   
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corporate law academy, scholars who worried about the skewed outcomes 
produced by our corporate governance system for working people and our 
environment never got as much attention as those who pushed for tearing down 
takeover defenses and making it easier for activist investors to influence company 
policies, and to tie CEO pay to total stock returns.  This stockholder-focused 
scholarship was not without contention, but it primarily centered on the question of 
whether corporate governance changes would have the effect of increasing stock 
prices (or some proxy for it like Tobin’s Q)—the blinkered metric that many 
corporate law academics took to be the correct measure, often without thinking 
deeply about it.40  As Professor Rock himself points out, this narrow prism was 
often justified by the idea that other bodies of law took care of matters like the fair 
treatment of workers or even creditors, consumer safety, and the protection of our 
environment.  Plus, positive law could theoretically even out the portions of the 
                                                 
40 The debate between Rob Daines and Guhan Subramanian illustrates this.  Compare Robert Daines, Does 
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001) (presenting evidence that Delaware corporate law 
improves firm value), with Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 32–59 (Harvard Olin Ctr. L., Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 391, 2002), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
345040 (refining Daines’s methodology and presenting evidence that his identified trend did not continue after 
1996).  Another example is the various debates between Lucian Bebchuk, on the one hand, and those more skeptical 
of takeovers and activism on the other.  Compare Bebchuk & Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, supra note 
26 (finding that staggered boards are associated with lower firm value), and Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates, 
IV, & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:  Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 
54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002) (same), with Steven M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 791, 817–18 (responding to Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, and arguing that their “shareholder 
primacy [model] is both normatively and positively inferior to the director primacy model”), and Martijn Cremers, 
Lubomir P. Litov, & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Long-Term Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422 
(2017) (finding that staggered boards can be positive for firm value), and Richard H. Koppes, Lyle G. Ganske & 
Charles T. Haag, Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate Over Classified Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 
1025–26 (1998) (arguing that staggered boards “best serve the interests of shareholders and management in many 
situations”). 
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economic pie by redistributive taxing and spending policies.41  Corporate law itself 
could just focus on the more burning question of whether the rules of corporate 
governance were optimally designed to increase stock prices.  Indeed, even a herd 
of elite law and economics scholars obsessed with agency costs largely ignored 
that most Americans were now stockholders of money managers, not companies 
themselves, and that these money managers had huge agency problems that made it 
difficult to align their actions with that of their diversified human investors.  The 
predominant strain was just on squeezing corporate management to get more juice 
to the stockholders,42 with pushback from a few traditionalist scholars who argued 
that there was long-term value to stockholders in a more managerialist model that 
reduces some of the short-term pressures of the market.43  Scholars who worried 
about other stakeholders were largely lumped into a general category of corporate 
social responsibility and not taken very seriously by those predominating at the 
elite law schools. 
                                                 
41 I say theoretically for two important reasons.  First, because of the influence of corporate and business elites on 
our political process, the likelihood of this happening has been rendered minuscule.  Second, my sense is that the 
scholars most likely to point to redistribution by government, rather than the need to make corporations pay fair 
wages, are the least likely as a class to support the taxing and spending policies that would be necessary to achieve 
anything like fairness. 
42 A primary means of doing so was making companies more susceptible to immediate market whims, through 
successful efforts to get rid of classified boards, turn decisions to withhold a proxy into a “no” vote that can unseat a 
director, and to have annual “say on pay” votes even though no rational person believes executive pay should be set 
on a year to year basis. 
43 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 86 
(2019) (arguing that director discretion best advances stockholder wealth). 
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Is this overstated?  If so, I would say not by much.  But equity requires 
tipping a hat to scholars and commentators who kept an eye on the bigger picture 
consequences of corporate governance.  That people like David Millon, Lyman 
Johnson, William Lazonick, Harold Meyerson, Thomas Geoghegan, Robert 
Kuttner, Brett McDonnell, Kent Greenfield, and Marleen O’Connor44 were not 
given the prominence of scholars like Lucian Bebchuk and Michael Jensen does 
not mean there was no debate.45  Rather, it means that what corporate law and 
finance elites mistook for the debate was but a narrow slice of it.46  At best, it 
                                                 
44 The list could go on, and include names like Damon Silvers, Stephen Pearlstein, John Coates, Larry Mitchell, and 
Bill Bratton—as well as emerging voices interested in the larger subject of corporate governance’s effect on society, 
like David Webber, Matthew Bodie, Elizabeth Pollman, Lynne Paine, Rebecca Henderson, Ewan McGaughey, 
Lenore Palladino, Zeynep Ton, Dalia Tsuk, David Yosifon, Rick Alexander, Chris Brummer, Lisa Fairfax, and 
Grant M. Hayden.  I am sure I have omitted many.  My point is that because these and other folks were interested 
and shone a light on how unequal the outcomes in our corporate governance system are, they helped bring about the 
eventual recognition by business elites that things needed to change. 
45 Even law and economics titans like Larry Summers questioned, for example, whether corporate takeovers were 
good for society, rather than just for stockholders.  See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in 
Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan. J. Auerbauch ed., 1988) 
(discussing negative effects of takeovers on workers).  In fact, after some distancing from that position, Professor 
Summers has returned strongly to the view that increasing the power of the stock market over companies, and 
decreasing the voice of workers, has had profoundly negative effects on our society.  See Anna Stansbury & 
Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis:  An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the 
American Economy (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27193, 2020), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193. 
46 Admittedly, the effects of our corporate governance system on workers has long been a preoccupation of my own.  
In 2007, a symposium issue of the Journal of Corporate Law addressed an article of mine, and had contributions 
from important thinkers ranging from Steve Bainbridge on the right, to Damon Silvers and Richard Ferlauto on the 
left, with important centrist corporate governance thinkers like Jack Bogle, Martin Lipton, Larry Hamermesh, Paul 
Rowe, John Olson, and Ron Gilson, all dilating on larger questions than were characteristic of that decade’s debate.  
See 33 J. Corp. L. (2007); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? The Shared Interests of 
Managers and Labor in a More Rational Corporate Governance System, 33 J. CORP. L. 1 (2007); see also Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of Globalization for the Effective 
Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 241 (2008); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Securing Our Nation’s 
Economic Future: A Sensible, Nonpartisan Agenda to Increase Long-Term Investment and Job Creation in the 
United States, 71 BUS. LAW. 1081 (2016). 
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meant grudgingly addressing Margaret Blair and the late Lynn Stout and their 
defense of director discretion as a better way for corporations to function and the 
argument that we should encourage not just fair treatment of, but increased firm-
specific investments in, workers and communities;47 and of course it meant 
aggressively taking on Marty Lipton’s long-standing defense of allowing directors 
room to embrace stakeholder governance.  This slice of the debate, however, rarely 
addressed the larger questions raised by some scholars about the effect corporate 
governance was having on inequality and the environment.48  Outside corporate 
law academia and in the policy realm, the same limited prism dominated for much 
of the period since the 1980s.  Much more time was spent on tearing down 
defenses to acquisitions and activism, and on tying CEO pay to stock performance, 
than on whether corporate boards were treating workers fairly, being 
environmentally responsible, or even prudently managing corporate risk.49   
                                                 
47 See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 
(1999) (arguing that the team production model justifies director discretion, allowing and encouraging firm-specific 
investments of all members of the corporation, including rank and file employees). 
48 For an example of high-quality scholarship of this stockholder-focused kind, see, e.g., Bebchuk, Coates, & 
Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards, supra note 40 (arguing that staggered boards 
are bad for stockholders).  Their article generated responses from other scholars trying to show the contrary.  
E.g., Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 819 (2002) (responding 
to Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, and arguing that tools such as use of a staggered board are important in 
balancing the bargaining power of acquirers and targets); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease 
Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845, 856–57 (2002) (responding to 
Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, and questioning whether the use of staggered boards is bad for stockholders 
given ex ante benefits); Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 40, at 817–18 (arguing 
that director primacy rather than shareholder primacy is normatively and positively better). 
49 Leo E. Strine, One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for 
the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1 (2010) (showing 
that even after the manage-to-the-market-driven debacles leading to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, institutional 
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But there were some in the vanguard who had their eye on the ball.  The 
Aspen Business and Society program, founded and directed by Judy Samuelson, 
has consistently focused on the bigger picture question of how corporations affect 
society, and what can be done to create a corporate governance system that 
produces more socially productive outcomes.50  And increasingly those in this 
camp began to recognize that making corporations more socially responsible 
required making the institutional investors who now controlled them live up to 
their responsibilities and embrace a more enlightened form of stewardship, one 
focused on fostering sustainable growth and the fair treatment of the workers 
whose capital they increasingly held.  And the founders of the nonprofit 
organization B Lab created a new form of corporation, the Benefit Corporation (“B 
Corps”), specifically designed to encourage corporations to serve a positive social 
purpose, to avoid externalities that harmed society, and to govern themselves in a 
                                                 
investors used their influence to push for more manage-to-the-market policies, such as reducing takeover defenses, 
votes on executive pay, and so-called “majority voting” to turn withhold votes into votes to unseat directors, and did 
not push for initiative to improve risk management and compliance). 
50 THE ASPEN INST., TOWARD A NEW CAPITALISM:  THE PROMISE OF OPPORTUNITY AND THE FUTURE OF WORK (Jan. 
12, 2017), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/the-promise-of-opportunity-and-the-future-of-work/; THE 
ASPEN INST., AMERICAN PROSPERITY PROJECT:  A NONPARTISAN FRAMEWORK FOR LONG-TERM INVESTMENT (Dec. 
19, 2016), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/the-american-prosperity-project-policy-framework/; THE 
ASPEN INST., LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS (June 15, 
2010), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/long-term-value-creation-guiding-principles-for-corporations-
and-investors/; THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM:  A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO 
INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (Sept. 16, 2009), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/
overcoming-short-termism-call-more-responsible-approach-investment-business-management/; JUDY SAMUELSON, 
Chapter 4, in THE SIX NEW RULES OF BUSINESS: CREATING REAL VALUE IN A CHANGING WORLD (Berrett-Koehler, 
2021). 
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manner that was fair to all stakeholders.51  Not only that, but they fueled a statutory 
movement to get the model passed in 38 states, including the market leader, 
Delaware.52  In short, long before the Business Roundtable, BlackRock, or other 
late-arriving yet well-meaning organizations affiliated with business elites that are 
cited by Professor Rock arrived on the scene, there were those deeply concerned 
that our corporate governance system was tilting far too much toward the “haves” 
at the expense of the many. 
In tracing the current dynamic to very recent statements by powerful wealthy 
interests, Professor Rock also slights a discussion of the important reasons why 
there has been so much growing societal interest in corporate governance reform.  
In this reply, I cannot do justice to those causes, but a few are worth underscoring. 
A. Bailing Out Those Who Caused the Need for the Bailout 
The evidence is undisputed that the financial sector of our economy has been 
a huge winner in recent generations.  But it is also hard to dispute that its wins 
have not been associated with corresponding gains for society as a whole, but 
                                                 
51 ABOUT B LAB, https://bcorporation.net/.  The founders of B Lab were Jay Coen Gilbert, Bart Houlahan, and 
Andrew Kassoy.  Jay Coen Gilbert, Bart Houlahan, and Andrew Kassoy – B-Lab Founders, CONSCIOUS 
CAPITALISM, https://www.consciouscapitalism.org/heroes/b-lab-founders. 
52 WHY PASS BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION, BENEFIT CORPORATION, https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers
/why-pass-benefit-corporation-legislation (“38 states including the District of Columbia have passed benefit 
corporation legislation.”); 8 Del. C. § 361; see also Frederick Alexander et al., From Shareholder Primacy to 
Stakeholder Capitalism, B LAB & THE S’HOLDER COMMONS (Sept. 7, 2020) (“As B Corps have been successful in 
both public and private markets, over 10,000 businesses have followed suit by becoming benefit corporations.  Over 
the last decade, these pioneers were enabled by our nonpartisan initiative that passed benefit corporation statutes in 
38 states, always with bipartisan support.”). 
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rather with an increasing concentration of wealth at the top, and greater wage 
stagnation and inequality for the rest.  Just as importantly, this financialization of 
the economy has been a cause of greater instability, leverage, and risk.  Sound 
businesses were acquired and levered up unsustainably, resulting in firm failures 
and layoffs.  Risky financial gamesmanship and fraud caused the demise of others.  
Imprudent lending practices fueled by the securitization casino proliferated.  This 
has repeatedly resulted in the American taxpayer coming to the rescue, with a 
recovery plan that has to date always put the financial sector, that which could 
fairly be said to have caused the crisis, at the front of the line in the response.  This 
series of bailouts—in 1987 after the Wall Street crash;53 in the 1990s to address the 
savings and loans crisis;54 in 2001 and 2002 during the recession identified with 
Enron and WorldCom;55 and of course in 2008 and 2009 after the financial crisis 
                                                 
53 STOCK MARKET CRASH OF 1987, FED. RES., https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/stock-market-crash-of-
1987 (documenting how the Federal Reserve served as a source of liquidity to support the financial system after the 
1987 stock market crash); Robert T. Parry, The October ’87 Crash Ten Years Later, FED. RES. BANK OF SAN 
FRANCISCO (Oct. 31, 1997) (documenting how the Federal Reserve responded to the 1987 crash, including by 
performing lender-of-last-resort activity and adding substantially to reserves through open market operations); 
Ken Phillips, The Bailout Bubble, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 28, 1997), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-dec-
28-op-2830-story.html (“Bailouts for U.S. investors took other forms as well.  After the stock market crashed in 
1987, the Federal Reserve pumped out money—liquidity, in red-suspender parlance—to get the indexes back up.  
Some traders contend that the Fed also bought futures contracts.”). 
54  Richard W. Stevenson, G.A.O. Puts Cost of S.& L. Bailout at Half a Trillion Dollars, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 1996), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/13/business/gao-puts-cost-of-s-l-bailout-at-half-a-trillion-dollars.html (reporting 
that the General Accounting Office estimated the final cost of the savings and loan bailout at $480.9 billion). 
55 Luka Nikolic, A Tale of Two Bubbles: How the Fed Crashed the Tech and the Housing Markets, F. ECON. EDUC. 
(Aug. 10, 2019), https://fee.org/articles/a-tale-of-two-bubbles-how-the-fed-crashed-the-tech-and-the-housing-
markets/ (“As a response to these two economic shocks, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan decided to cut 
rates to one percent starting in 2001 in order to stimulate the economy.  This expansionary policy was Greenspan’s 
weapon of choice, as he had been praised in the past for saving the United States from several crises by using the 
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that caused the Great Recession56—has involved huge infusions of cash to the 
financial sector, who get to factor it for profit in doling out indirectly the stimulus 
and relief needed by the many harmed by the irresponsibility.  The grossly 
inequitable outcomes following these debacles, in which the larger public 
experienced economic insecurity, losses of employment, and a growing gap 
between themselves and the financiers and corporate managers at the top, 
increased public cynicism, caused understandable discontent, and led many to 
question the idea that markets were fair and well designed to price and therefore 
address excessive risk.  The continued focus of institutional investors on making 
public companies more and more subject to immediate market whims, inflating the 
pay of CEOs to compensate them for managing ruthlessly to increase total stock 
return, and facilitating hedge fund activism, inversions to tax havens, and going 
private, rather than on risk management and prudence, compounded these 
concerns.  We shall see whether the imbalanced pandemic recovery efforts that 
                                                 
same policy.  After 11 federal funds rate cuts, the federal funds rate was one percent from June 2003 to June 
2004.”). 
56See BAILOUT TRACKER, PROPUBLICA (last updated Nov. 9, 2020), https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/ (tracking 
the $700 billion-plus bailout to rescue the financial system during the Great Recession); Deborah Lucas, Measuring 
the Costs of Bailouts, 11 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 85 (Feb. 2019) (estimating the direct cost of the bailouts associated 
with the 2008 financial crisis as being around $500 billion, with the largest direct beneficiaries being the unsecured 
creditors of financial institutions); Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During Bailouts, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/business/31pay.html (reporting on the billions 
recipients of the government bailout spent on bonuses for high-level executives). 
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have taken a markedly Wall Street and stockholder-first approach further turns up 
the heat on policy makers for change. 
B. Perhaps Crime Does Pay, If It Is Done by Corporations 
The huge costs to society and danger to the future of humanity caused by 
other forms of corporate overreaching has also increased the demand for changes 
to corporate governance itself.  The most high profile of the issues, and the one that 
has played the biggest role in fueling demands for investors and companies to 
change their behavior, has been around climate change.  The fact that many 
segments of corporate America, particularly in the energy space, used corporate 
resources to obscure the realities of the harm being caused by human-driven 
carbon emissions, to deter action at a time when it would have been easier to 
address the harm, and to put immediate profits over the future of humanity angered 
many.57  It eventually rung bells among the “haves” who realized that an economic 
system that was so focused on the short term that it could harm our planet, 
endanger our species, and destroy many others was unsustainable and dangerous.  
But, climate change is just one example.  The opioid addiction crisis that has 
harmed millions was caused in large part by corporations putting profit over 
                                                 
57 For a timeline of these energy industry efforts at concealment and confusion, see Tweet the Story of the Fossil 
Fuel Industry’s Climate Deception, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/ 
resources/tweet-story-fossil-fuel-industry’s-climate –deception. 
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morals in the most basic sense.58  Other scandals in the banking industry centered 
on the exploitation of vulnerable clients, particularly those with limited means, by 
selling them products and services they did not need, and in some cases did not 
even know they were paying for.59  Yet, while American prisons are filled with 
poor and especially black people who have committed economic crimes,60 the 
incarceration of corporate leaders who cause such widespread harm by intentional 
acts of deceit and overreaching were rare.61  And when human beings who are not 
corporate leaders commit crimes, no one worries whether their business continues 
apace while they are in prison, or what that economic impact might be.  But when 
corporations commit crimes, they (and hence their investors) do not suffer the kind 
of devastating economic harm that individuals often do.62  Rather, corporations just 
                                                 
58 See, e.g., Geoff Mulvihill, OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma Pleads Guilty in Criminal Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Nov. 24, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/purdue-pharma-opioid-crisis-guilty-plea-
5704ad896e964222a011f053949e0cc0 (“Purdue Pharma pleaded guilty [] to three criminal charges, formally taking 
responsibility for its part in an opioid epidemic that has contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths.”). 
59 An iconic American financial institution, Wells Fargo, has come to exemplify this issue.  Brian Tayan, The Wells 
Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/06/the-wells-fargo-cross-selling-scandal-2/. 
60 Karen Dolan, The Poor Get Prison: The Alarming Spread of the Criminalization of Poverty, INST. POL’Y STUD. 
(Mar. 18, 2015), https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-Get-Prison-Final.pdf (“Poor people, 
especially people of color, face a far greater risk of being fined, arrested, and even incarcerated for minor offenses 
than other Americans.  A broken taillight, an unpaid parking ticket, a minor drug offense, sitting on a sidewalk, or 
sleeping in a park can all result in jail time.”). 
61 The reader interested in the subject of whether corporate law has been enforced as vigorously as it should have 
been in recent decades should see JENNIFER TRAUB, BIG DIRTY MONEY: THE SHOCKING INJUSTICE AND UNSEEN 
COSTS OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (Viking 2017); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., CORPORATE CRIME & PUNISHMENT:  THE 
CRISIS OF UNDERENFORCEMENT (Barrett-Koehler 2020). 
62 Terry-Ann Craigie et al, Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings: How Involvement with the Criminal 
Justice System Deepens Inequality, BRENNAN CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y ADVOC. (SEPT. 15, 2020), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/conviction-imprisonment-and-lost-earnings-how-
involvement-criminal (“[T]hose who spend time in prison miss out on more than half the future income they might 
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proceed under new, or sometimes even the same, management, after paying fines 
that many of them regard as just the price of doing business. 
C. More Pie for the Few, Crumbs for the Many 
Perhaps no factor has driven demand for change more than the profound 
shift in gainsharing that has characterized American corporate governance during 
the last 40 years.63  Sure, we all wish that the overall pie would have grown more, 
but we aren’t inventing new products as transformational as the automobile and 
refrigerator now.64  But plenty of new pie was baked.  What changed the most was 
not growth, but how the spoils of improved productivity and profitability were 
distributed.  Consistent with the power dynamics of a corporate governance and 
                                                 
otherwise have earned. . . . As a perpetual drag on the earning potential of tens of millions of Americans, these costs 
are not only borne by individuals, their families, and their communities.  They are also system-wide drivers of 
inequality and are so large as to have macroeconomic consequences.”); Matthew Menendez & Lauren-Brooke Eisen, 
The Steep Costs of Criminal Justice Fees and Fines, BRENNAN CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y ADVOC. (Nov. 21, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/steep-costs-criminal-justice-fees-and-fines (“[C]riminal 
justice debt represents a significant barrier to a person’s chances of successfully reentering society following a 
conviction.  It also hurts the families of those who are incarcerated, depriving them of a wage earner while adding 
new court costs to the defendant’s criminal debts.”). 
63 For excellent literature on this and showing that inequality and wage stagnation has grown enormously in the 
period since the Reagan Administration, see Emanuel Saez & Gabriel Zachman, Wealth Inequality in the U.S. Since 
1913: Evidence From the Capitalized Income Tax Data (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20625, 
2014), https://perma.cc/E77Y-B54u; Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, ECON. POL. INST., https://www.epi.org/ 
publication/charting-wage-stagnation/; Chad Stone et al, A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income 
Equality, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-
28011pov._0.pdf.; Katherine Schaefer, 6 Facts About Economic Inequality in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 7, 
2020), https://www.pew research.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-facts-about-economic-inequality-in-the-us/; Drew 
DeSilver, For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely Budged in Decades, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://WS.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-have-barelybudged-for-decades/.  
For example, real median household income has only grown by 22 percent since 1984, while the top 1%’s income 
has grown by 180%.  Saez & Zachman, supra, at tbl. 2.   
64 See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE 
CIVIL WAR (Princeton Univ. Press 2017) (describing how the rate of growth since 1970 has declined because the 
life-altering scale of innovations between 1870 and 1970 cannot be repeated).  
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political system skewed toward the powerful and against other stakeholders, the 
share for top management, stockholders, and money managers went way up, while 
the share for workers below top management went way down.65  The distributional 
impact of this shift was profound because the stockholder class, even today, 
remains unrepresentative of the general American public and is comparatively 
much better off.66  Shifting a large portion of what had formerly gone into worker’s 
pay caused much greater economic insecurity and inequality, and it particularly 
hurt black Americans—in their first half-century of anything remotely resembling 
free participation in the labor market—who are much more likely to be in the 
                                                 
65 The data shows that largely up until the Reagan Administration reversed our nation’s commitment to the New 
Deal, equality in the United States was rising, including for Black Americans, and wage increases for workers were 
more closely correlated with increases in corporate profits, CEO pay, and stock prices.  Since that period, there has 
been a huge decline in the share of capitalist gains in worker pay, while there have been seismic increases in the 
return to stockholders and top managers.  See generally The Productivity—Pay Gap, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July 2019), 
https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap/ (“From 1979 to 2018, net productivity rose 69.6 percent, while the hourly 
pay of typical workers essentially stagnated—increasing only 11.6 percent over 39 years (after adjusting for 
inflation).”).  
To cite only one of many stark examples, American productivity grew 69.6 percent from 1979 to 2018, while CEO 
compensation grew by 940%, and the S&P 500 grew by 2400%.  For U.S. workers?  A total increase of 11.6%.  Id.; 
see also William Lazonick, The Financialization of the US Corporation:  What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be 
Regained, 36 SEATTLE L. REV. 857, 857–60 (2013) (describing how inequality declined during the post-World War 
II era, and then increased markedly since the 1980s).   
66 Robin Wigglesworth, How America’s 1% Came to Dominate Stock Ownership:  Market’s Tenfold Gain Since 
1990 Has Mostly Gone to the Richest Part of the Population, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020), https://financial 
post.com/investing/how-americas-1-came-to-dominate-stock-ownership (citing statistics that the top 1% own 56% 
of stocks, that the remainder of the top 10% own most of the rest, and that the 90% of Americans below the top 10% 
only own 12% of the stock, and noting that the trends toward the top have accelerated in recent decades); see also B. 
Ravikumar, How Has Stock Ownership Trended in the Past Few Decades, ST. LOUIS FED (April 9, 2018), 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/april/stock-ownership-trended-past-few-decades (demonstrating 
the trend toward greater inequality, with the top decile owning the overwhelming bulk of stock). 
 
For an excellent overall summary of just how unequal income and wealth is distributed in the United States, see G. 
William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?, https://whorulesamerica.ucsc.edu/power/ 
wealth.html. 
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working and lower middle class.67  Many elites sloughed off the growing 
inequality as solely the result of globalization, or as only involving uneducated 
workers.  But that ignored the reality that the decline in gainshifting was much 
greater in the United States;68 involved how gains were distributed rather than 
                                                 
67 See Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, supra note 66, at 7 (showing that the income gap disfavoring black 
people is growing, that they are far behind white people, and that the wealth gap in favor of white people in 2013 
was over 200 to 1 when home equity was excluded); Kim Parker & Richard Fry, More Than Half of U.S. 
Households Have Some Investments in the Stock Market, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/25/more-than-half-of-u-s-households-have-some-investment-in-the-
stock-market/ (showing median stockholdings of black Americans at one-fifth that of white Americans); Kristin 
McIntosh et al, Examining the Black-White Wealth Gap, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/ (showing the huge wealth 
and income gap disfavoring black Americans and demonstrating that it is growing); David Leonhardt, The Black-
White Wage Gap Is As Big As It Was in the 1950s, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
06/25/opinion/sunday/race-wage-gap.html (documenting that racial wealth and income gap shrunk in the post-war 
era, citing scholars attributing this to rising wages due to strong unions, the inclusion of formerly excluded jobs that 
many black workers held in the minimum wage by Great Society legislation in 1966, and other policies that 
benefited all working people, but that these gains then reversed from the 1980s forward).  See generally Facts: 
Racial Economic Inequality, INEQUALITY.ORG, https://inequality.org/facts/racial-inequality/ (comprehensively 
documenting racial inequality, including that the median black family had net wealth of only $3,500 compared to 
white median family wealth of $147,000, and that this trend has grown considerably since the early 1980s; showing 
that of the Fortune 500 CEOs just 14 were Black or Latino, whereas Black and Latinos would comprise 44.1% of 
the workers who would benefit from increasing the federal minimum wage; and that top 10% of Black families earn 
only around $60,000 compared to $117,986 for white families; and that white workers made 28% more than the 
typical Black worker). 
 
For an excellent article discussing profound racial inequality and situating it within the current pandemic, see Elise 
Gould & Valerie Wilson, Black Workers Face Two of the Most Lethal Preexisting Conditions for Coronavirus—
Racism and Inequality, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 1, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workers-covid/. 
 
For an article connecting corporate governance with racial inequality, see Eleanor Bloxham & Bruce F. Freed, It’s 
Time for Boards and Institutional Investors to Act on Racial Justice, BARRON’S (June 19, 2020), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/its-time-for-boards-and-institutional-investors-to-act-on-racial-justice-
51592527239 (describing the role of large institutional investors in enabling racial justice by opposing corporate 
political disclosure resolutions, which enabled companies to quietly donate to Republicans and help flip state 
legislatures and elect governors who opposed legislation or programs that would address inequality and racial justice 
issues). 
68 Domhoff, supra note 66, at 11, 17 (showing that U.S. income inequality now far exceeds that of its major market 
economy allies—including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom—and that there is a similar trend in wealth 
concentration); Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis:  An 
Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 
27193, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193 (demonstrating how much of greater inequality in the United 
States can be attributed to the change in power dynamics within corporate governance, with worker power going 
down and stock market and institutional investor power increasing). 
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whether American companies were competitive; that the American workforce was 
more educated and capable of adaptation than ever before;69 and that many highly 
educated and skilled workers suffered from wage stagnation.  This declining share 
for workers not only hurt Black workers, it also hit many white workers and 
opened the door for divisive appeals (in varying degrees of subtlety) blaming the 
fate of struggling white workers on people of color and immigrants, and pitting 
workers against each other.   
For more constructive observers, the declining share represented a failure to 
remember the lessons of history and a return to economic policies that had led to 
the Great Depression and the rise of Communism and Fascism.70  These observers 
wanted a restoration of the New Deal/European Social Democratic model in which 
market economies function more equitably, and to adapt that model to meet the 
challenges of the concentrated financial power existing in the 21st Century.71 
                                                 
69 For a comprehensive examination of why wage stagnation occurred and a refutation of the idea that it was due to a 
decline in the education and skills of the U.S. workforce, especially given stagnation in wages among college-
educated middle managers, see generally William Lazonick, Labor in the 21st Century:  The Top 0.1% and the 
Disappearing Middle-Class (Inst. For New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 4, 2105), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2586239. 
70 The economic programs proposed by both President-elect Biden and his leading primary opponent, Senator 
Bernie Sanders, were both grounded on this viewpoint, with the president-elect hewing more strictly to the 
American example set by the New Deal and Great Society, while Senator Sanders more openly embraced lessons 
from our EU social democratic allies.  See ECONOMIC RECOVERY, BIDEN-HARRIS TRANSITION, 
https://buildbackbetter.gov/priorities/economic-recovery/ (seeking to create millions of new good-paying union jobs 
and to mobilize the economy with an infrastructure plan); BERNIE SANDERS ON THE ISSUES, BERNIESANDERS.COM, 
https://berniesanders.com/issues/ (proposing, for example, doubling union membership, eliminating “Right to Work 
for Less” laws, enacting a federal jobs guarantee, and creating millions of healthcare and New Green Deal jobs). 
71 For a variety of views aligned with this perspective, see A New Deal For This New Century:  Making Our 
Economy Work for All, NYU L. INST. CORP. GOV. & FIN. (Oct. 3–4, 2019), https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/icgf/ 
events/new-deal-new-century; Economic Policy Conference, NYU L. INST. CORP. GOV. & FIN. (Oct. 1, 2020), 
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D.  The Corporate Power Ratchet:  How Corporate Influence Has 
Made Externality Regulation Less Effective and Less Realistic 
Now, the final causal factor is one that Professor Rock eludes to, but largely 
by asking the question:  why not just pass laws and adopt regulations to protect 
workers, consumers, the environment, and society generally from excessive 
corporate greed?  He adverts briefly to the frustration that has been felt by the 
inability of our society to sustain the New Deal/Great Society consensus and to 
ensure that our economy works in a balanced way that helps the many.72  But he 
ends his article on a conservative note, fearing that the demands for change within 
corporate governance itself threaten more harm than they promise good.73  In 
describing the factors leading to where we now are, Professor Rock highlights 
Milton Friedman and his belief that corporations should focus exclusively on 
making profits within the rules of the game.74 
But what Professor Rock does not discuss is that Milton Friedman and his 
acolytes have also engaged in a relentless campaign to eviscerate the rules of the 
game that protect workers and other corporate stakeholders.  Their inculcation of 
                                                 
https://its.law.nyu.edu/eventcalendar/index.cfm?fuseaction=main.detail&id=78618.  Neither of these conferences 
would have occurred but for the leadership of the NYU Law Institute for Corporate Governance and Finance that 
Professor Rock heads. 
72 Rock, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
73 Id. at 30. 
74 Id. at 26–27. 
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their belief system into generations of corporate leaders has led to corporations 
using their vast resources to distort our political process.75  The name Lewis Powell 
is not cited by Professor Rock, but Powell, more famous as a justice of the 
Supreme Court, inspired “praxis” by corporate America to fill out Friedman’s 
vision.76  In his capacity as an advisor to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Powell 
called on the American business community to rise up against the regulatory state 
and to use all their resources to impede it, by lobbying aggressively against 
legislation, electing candidates who favored corporate interests, and using the 
judiciary as an instrument to get its way.77   
During the period when the business community has embraced Powell’s call 
to arms, some important laws did get through the legislation gantlet that business 
lobbyists and contributors erected to stop important legislation protecting society.  
                                                 
75 See Liz Kennedy, Corporate Capture Threatens Democratic Government, CTR. AMERICAN PROGRESS (Mar. 29, 
2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/news/2017/03/29/429442/corporate-capture-threatens-
democratic-government/; Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note 12. 
76 My use of the Marxist term for converting theory into action is a hat tip to Professor Rock’s citation to Vladimir 
Lenin and the importance of ideology in affecting behavior.  Rock, supra note 1, at 22. 
77 Memorandum from Lewis Powell to the Chairman of the Education Committee of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Attack on American Free Enterprise System (Aug. 23, 1971), https://research.greenpeaceusa.org/?
a=view&d=5971&_ga=2.180401764.2131756745.1607699824-1906142670.1607699824.  Powell could never feel 
his advice was not taken.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other corporate interests dominate lobbying 
expenditures.  Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note 12, at 431–32 n.31 (collecting sources demonstrating 
this point); Leo E. Strine, Jr & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course: The Tension Between Conservative 
Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 359–62, 387 (2015) (collecting sources 
demonstrating how much corporate political spending surged after Citizens United allowed the use of treasury funds 
for that purpose); see also Megan R. Wilson, Lobbying’s Top 50:  Who’s Spending Big, THE HILL (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/R4Y7-TQSA (showing that 49 of the top 50 spending lobbying interests were business or business-
related). 
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But many of those laws were struck down by an increasingly activist judiciary, 
which departed from past precedent to reach out and strike down legislation, such 
as McCain–Feingold,78 Medicaid expansion in the Affordable Care Act,79 and the 
Voting Rights Act.80  The business community also weaponized the litigation 
process to get activist judges to strike down important environmental regulations;81 
use the First Amendment to elevate the interests of corporations over protections 
for their workers, consumers, and even public safety against firearms;82 and render 
hollow the protections of laws like the National Labor Relations Act.83   
By exercising their political muscle and expenditures, corporate America 
tilted the whole political system to the right, seating federal and state officials who 
often sought to undermine the implementation of laws on the books and made it 
                                                 
78 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
79 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
80 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
81 E.g., Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014); Rapanos v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
82 The scholarship of John Coates, Robert Post, and Amanda Shandor documents this well.  See John C. Coates, IV, 
Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223 (2015); 
Robert Post & Amanda Shandor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2015).  And, of 
course, compare the treatment of corporations in Citizens United with the treatment of labor unions in cases like 
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 
431 U.S. 209 (1977).  See also Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Jonathan R. Macey, Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 
2019 WIS. L. REV. 451 (2019) (discussing this issue); Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note 
77, at 359–62, 387 (same). 
83 For my own comprehensive take on this phenomenon, see Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note 12.  For 
discussion of the negative effect of this on the ability of workers to exercise their rights under the NLRA, see Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Development on a Cracked Foundation: How the Incomplete Nature of New Deal Labor Reform 
Presaged Its Ultimate Decline: A Response to Cuéllar, Levi, and Weingast, 57 HARV. J. LEG. 67, 83–84 (2020). 
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much more difficult to pass new legislation.84  The effects of these integrated 
actions were reinforcing, because passing legislation not only got harder, but if the 
legislation did go through, the likelihood that it or key implementing regulations 
would get struck down by the courts also grew.85 
With these corporate power dynamics making external regulation to protect 
society and corporate stakeholders much less effective and realistic, it seems to me 
natural and not at all surprising that advocates for workers, consumers, and the 
environment would begin to demand reforms to corporate law itself.  That seems 
even more natural when so many Americans were becoming “forced capitalists,” 
effectively required by federal mandate to turn over part of their pay every month 
to money managers, if they were lucky enough to be paid sufficiently to be able to 
                                                 
84 As an important new study by the Center for Political Accountability shows, the amount of spending by public 
companies to influence political elections is huge, goes overwhelmingly to Republican candidates and committees, 
and has been used to seat candidates who have gerrymandered legislative districts and put in place ballot restrictions 
harming black people; opposed action to address climate change; opposed LGBTQ rights; attacked the Affordable 
Care Act, including during the pandemic; and sought to restrain women’s reproductive rights.  CONFLICTED 
CONSEQUENCES, CTR. POL. ACCOUNTABILITY (July 21, 2020), https://politicalaccountability.net/hifi/ 
files/Conflicted-Consequences.pdf.  As the report shows, in many cases the companies donating large amounts to 
candidates and committees taking these policy positions were, at the same time, publicly claiming that their 
corporate policy was to the contrary.  That is, these corporations were saying one thing on issues like racial justice 
and climate change, while using their funds to tilt government policy in the opposite direction. 
85 In other work, I have explained how the ideology of stockholder primacy encourages corporations to focus their 
political spending on supporting candidates and committees that will minimize regulation of corporate externalities.  
Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note 77, at 349–50; Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra 
note 12, at 442.  There is evidence that companies that engage more of such rent-seeking behavior tend to perform 
less well than companies that instead focus on making money by developing and selling high-quality products and 
services.  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate 
Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1007, 1034–35 (2020). 
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save for retirement.86  Perhaps, these advocates thought, if corporate law itself, and 
particularly the power dynamics within it, would change, we can get corporations 
themselves to behave more responsibly.  Not only would this involve them treating 
their stakeholders and society better, it would also specifically involve trying to 
limit the extent to which corporations use their influence to prevent the political 
process from putting in place effective external regulations.  That is, in order to 
revitalize external regulation, advocates of a fairer society rationally became 
convinced that internal corporate governance reform was required. 
V. Time for 21st Century Corporate Governance for a 21st Century 
Economy:  A More Optimistic, and Less Fearful, Perspective 
Professor Rock ends on a pessimistic note.  He fears that instead of focusing 
on external laws protecting stockholders, populist pressures will be exerted on 
corporate law itself and result in changes that undermine, rather than improve, 
social welfare.87 
I am more optimistic.88  For starters, one of the most central proposals for 
reforming corporate law, the public benefit corporation model, builds on and 
                                                 
86 Strine, Fiduciary Blind Spot, supra note 85, at 1011, 1020–22 (describing how “the mutual fund industry is 
federally subsidized because powerful tax incentives require American workers to become ‘forced capitalists’”). 
87 In this skepticism that corporate law itself has much to offer stakeholders like workers, Professor Rock echoes 
well-reasoned arguments from scholars like Steve Bainbridge and Ron Gilson.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in Corporate Governance: A Comment on Strine, 33 J. CORP. L. 21, 24–26 
(2007) (explaining reasons he believes corporate law has little potential to help workers in particular); Ronald J. 
Gilson, Leo Strine’s Third Way: Responding To Agency Capitalism, 33 J. CORP. L. 47, 54–55 (2007) (arguing that 
law external to corporate law, not within corporate law, is what should and can protect workers). 
88 This does not mean I am correct, of course.  In the period running up to the 2016 election, I believed that the 
obvious economic insecurity in the nation would lead to pressures for bipartisan action to make our economy fairer, 
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strengthens traditional corporate law, rather than turning it upside down.  In 
particular, the model rests on two important and related factors that other 
commentators also tend to slight in addressing the corporate purpose debate.  The 
first is that part of the genius of American corporate law, if it has any, has been in 
determining the conditions under which it is best for the judiciary to keep its hands 
off corporate decision-making.89  This is fundamental to the business judgment rule 
itself, which provides, as Professor Rock emphasizes, wide discretion for corporate 
directors, even in Delaware, to govern the firm in a manner that is respectful of all 
stakeholders, so long as in doing so the directors seek to advance the interests of 
the stockholders as well.90  The second is that corporate law often seeks to promote 
                                                 
and so did others.  See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Securing Our Nation’s Economic Future:  A Sensible, 
Nonpartisan Agenda to Increase Long-Term Investment and Job Creation in the United States, 71 BUS. LAW. 1081 
(2016) (discussing a specific agenda to address calls for economic reform); THE ASPEN INST., AMERICAN 
PROSPERITY PROJECT:  A NONPARTISAN FRAMEWORK FOR LONG-TERM INVESTMENT 5–6 (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2017/01/American-Prosperity-Project_Policy-Framework_FINAL-
1.3.17.pdf.  But only one candidate talked about economic insecurity during that election (albeit in a divisive and 
counterproductive way), and what has resulted is four years of inaction, at best, even as there has been an 
intensification of the trend toward inequality and unfairness.  We shall see what the new election results portend, but 
I believe that FDR’s view of fear, expressed in his 1933 inaugural address, is as relevant today.  First Inaugural 
Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBRARY, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_
century/froos1.asp (“This is preeminently the time to speak the truth, the whole truth, frankly and boldly.  Nor need 
we shrink from honestly facing conditions in our country today.  This great Nation will endure as it has endured, 
will revive and will prosper.  So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear 
itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.  In 
every dark hour of our national life a leadership of frankness and vigor has met with that understanding and support 
of the people themselves which is essential to victory.”). 
89 See Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, supra note 43, at 109–29 (arguing that “the 
business judgement rule is justified precisely because judicial review threatens the board’s authority,” that judges 
are not business experts, and that the BJR encourages risk taking and has positive effects on internal board 
dynamics); Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note 47, at 315–16 (arguing that 
providing directors wide discretion to act, so long as they are not using their positions to benefit themselves, allows 
them the latitude to promote the joint welfare of the corporation). 
90 Rock, supra note 1, at 20; see also Jonathan Macey, Sublime Myths:  An Essay In Honor of the Shareholder Value 
Maximization Myth and the Tooth Fairy, 91 TEX. L. REV. 911, 920 (2013) (arguing that the business judgment rule 
acts to “eviscerate large swaths of the notion of shareholder value maximization”); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing 
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certain conduct by corporate managers by means of encouragement and the 
articulation of a normative duty, not by threat of monetary liability.  A good 
example of this is the duty articulated by the Caremark case in Delaware.91  As a 
normative matter, Chancellor Allen’s decision encouraged directors to step up and 
be active monitors to ensure that their companies put in place and attended to 
systems of reporting and monitoring designed to ensure compliance with law.  For 
that reason, Caremark is rightly seen as having inspired greater compliance efforts 
by corporate America.92  But Chancellor Allen did not expose directors to 
negligence-based liability; rather, he immunized them from that and held that they 
could only be liable if they acted in bad faith, by failing to even try to exercise 
their monitoring duties.93  This discordance between what is expected of directors 
                                                 
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 NYU L. REV. 733, 770–72 (2005) (arguing to the same effect); LYNN 
STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:  HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 32 (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2012) (same). 
91 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
92 See Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty Year Lookback, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOV. 
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/29/caremark-and-compliance-a-twenty-year-lookback/ 
(“In nearly all narratives of how compliance has grown as a legal subject and field of practice in the last two 
decades, the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in In re Caremark plays a featured role.”).  But see id. (“I join the 
lively academic debate over whether Caremark’s causal impact on the unmistakable growth curve of compliance has 
been overstated.”); Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone:  Directors’ Evolving Duty to 
Monitor 4–5, 23–24 (NYU L. Ctr. L., Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 08-57, 2008) (arguing that Caremark was 
successful in expanding directors’ oversight duties and incentivizing them to assume active oversight over legal 
compliance, but that its success is limited and heavily dependent on the clarity of the law, since bad-faith liability is 
narrow). 
93 698 A.2d at 972. 
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normatively and what they can be held liable for in damages is now, because of the 
ubiquity of exculpatory charter clauses, standard in American corporate law.94 
In the period during which Milton Friedman wrote his famous essay, both of 
these factors could be seen to have had prominence in the purpose debate.  At that 
time, stockholders were still seen as dispersed and relatively weak, and managers 
comparatively powerful.  Thus, many on the political right feared that corporate 
managers would use their power to advance liberal political values using corporate 
funds.95  They worried that the slack that the business judgment rule gave 
managers insulated them from accountability to stockholders, that stockholders 
would see their invested capital used for political and social purposes that they did 
not share, and thus they argued that, within the bounds of the law, corporate 
managers should focus on creating profits for stockholders.  In other words, they 
sought to articulate and inculcate a normative duty of managers that would cause 
them to put profit first, and to be reticent to impose their social norms on society 
through the exercise of corporate power.  The advocates of this world view pressed 
their position in not just the political process, but in academia, the business press, 
and particularly in forums for management education. 
                                                 
94 See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-Governing 
Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001). 
95 Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note 77 at 352–53. 
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As Professor Rock shows, the first factor—the room provided by the 
business judgment rule—also played a role in reaction to the takeover wave of the 
1980s.  The so-called constituency statutes were adopted to give corporate 
managers additional room under the business judgment rule to resist takeovers and 
to govern in a manner that treated all stakeholders as equal.96  But those statutes are 
notable for the extent to which they did not take into account the second factor:  
the statutes enabled corporate management to consider stakeholder interests but did 
not mandate it.  Not only did the statutes generally provide no enforcement 
mechanism at all, there was nothing to enforce because the statutes just gave 
corporate directors—elected solely by stockholders and subject to removal solely 
by them—an option to give consideration to the interests of stakeholders like 
employees, communities of operations, and consumers.  For those related reasons, 
there is little evidence that these statutes helped stakeholders; at most, they seem to 
have given corporate managers leverage in takeover disputes to take care of their 
own interests.97 
                                                 
96 Rock, supra note 1, at 28. 
97 Bebchuk, Kastiel, & Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, supra note 18; Julian Velasco, The 
Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 463–64 (2006) (explaining that these statutes 
have been “rather insignificant” because they are permissive and do not provide any enforcement rights to other 
stakeholders); Ronald J. Gilson, Leo Strine’s Third Way:  Responding to Agency Capitalism, 33 J. CORP. L. 47, 52 
(2007) (briefly explaining why he never believed constituency and antitakeover statutes would protect workers). 
 
52 
 
The lessons from these experiences have been both over- and under-
emphasized, in the debate between what might fairly be called “managerialist 
stakeholder advocates” and those favoring stockholder-focused corporate 
governance. 
The managerialists who advocate stakeholder governance have fetishized the 
importance of normative purpose.98  They argue rightly that normative purpose 
matters, but act as if a rearticulation of normative purpose alone will rebalance the 
American corporate governance system in a way that is fairer to stakeholders.  But, 
interestingly, those who take this position typically wish to just act as if Delaware 
law is something other than it is, and ignore the evidence that constituency statutes 
have done nothing substantively to protect workers or communities.  Put simply, 
those in this camp are, in essence, managerialists who will not go beyond giving 
directors the discretion to act with respect toward other stakeholders, within overall 
corporate law structures that give power only to stockholders.  In fact, these 
managerialists will not even use the word “shall” to describe a director’s duty to 
other stakeholders, much less indulge the notion of giving stakeholders 
enforcement or other rights. 
                                                 
98 Until late in her all too brief career, Professor Lynn Stout tended to ignore the power dynamics within American 
corporate governance that made normative purpose an inadequate answer to her desire for stakeholder-respecting 
governance.  But her last major work acknowledged this problem and advanced a bold and novel idea to address 
this.  See LYNN STOUT, TAMARA BELINFANTI, & SERGIO GRAMITTO, CITIZEN CAPITALISM:  HOW A UNIVERSAL 
FUND CAN PROVIDE INCOME AND INFLUENCE TO ALL (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2019). 
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But stockholder advocates also share this fetish with purpose in itself.  In a 
21st century in which powerful money managers can and do act quickly to impose 
change on public companies, some still fear that corporate managers will have too 
much slack to impose their own values on society, at the cost of stockholders, if 
corporate law allows boards to treat the best interests of all stakeholders as a 
proper end of corporate governance.99  They ignore factors that Professor Rock 
does not, which render this fear of untethered management running wild highly 
improbable.  These include:  i) the enormous power and ease of action for 
institutional investors; ii) vigorous global and domestic competition; iii) provisions 
of corporate law that make it impossible for founders who own large blocks to pay 
out dividends to themselves without comparable treatment of other investors; and 
                                                 
99 My esteemed friend Lucian Bebchuk continues to harbor this concern, and so do other scholars like Jesse Fried, 
Glenn Hubbard, and Mark Roe.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder 
Governance, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544978 (arguing that stakeholder 
capitalism could impose substantial costs on shareholders and reduce accountability of corporate leaders); Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, A Free Market Manifesto That Changed the World, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/09/11/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-doctrine-social-responsibility-of-business.html; Sanjai Bhagat 
& R. Glenn Hubbard, For Whom Should Corporations Be Run?, AEIDEAS (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.aei.org/
economics/for-whom-should-corporations-be-run/ (“Who monitors the stakeholder monitor?  It is this concern that 
animated Friedman’s 1970 contribution.”).  For a standard and succinct expression of this concern, see FRANK 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (Harvard U. 1991) (“[A] 
manager who has been told to serve two masters . . . has been freed of both and answerable to none.”). 
 
For other and similar criticisms about stakeholder capitalism, see Steve Kaplan, The Enduring Wisdom of Milton 
Friedman, PROMARKET (Sept. 14, 2020), https://promarket.org/2020/09/14/the-enduring-wisdom-of-milton-
friedman/ (“Friedman brings up a vital concern about dividing loyalties in this way.  ‘If businessmen are civil 
servants rather than the employees of their stockholders, then in a democracy they will sooner or later be chosen by 
the public techniques of election and appointment.  And long before this occurs, their decision-making power will 
have been taken away from them.’”); Eugene F. Fama, Market Forces Already Address ESG Issues and the Issues 
Raised by Stakeholder Capitalism, PROMARKET (Sept. 25, 2020), https://promarket.org/2020/09/25/market-forces-
esg-issues-stakeholder-capitalism-contracts/ (arguing that contract structures already address ESG concerns). 
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iv) the provisions of corporate law that strongly discourage self-dealing.100  In fact, 
experience under constituency statutes shows that stockholders have little to fear 
from a “may” regime, but stakeholders have nothing to gain from it.101 
Professor Rock takes Senator Elizabeth Warren to task a bit for a reason 
relevant to this discussion:  he properly points out that nothing in the substantive 
corporate law of Delaware changed during the period in which she rightly argues 
that our corporate governance system has swung strongly toward stockholders and 
against workers and other stakeholders.102  But, in doing so, he slights something 
his own scholarship takes seriously, which is that directors’ normative views of 
what their duty is matters.  Senator Warren’s quoted statement does fairly address 
a profound change in attitude by many CEOs over those of prior generations.  And 
that attitude had a self-justifying effect, as Chicago-school academics argued that if 
CEOs managed to drive so-called “shareholder value” they were best serving 
society. 
                                                 
100 As to the last point, commentators often ignore that workers, creditors, and communities stand to lose more than 
diversified investors if corporate management self-deal or fail to pursue a profitable business strategy.  On most 
issues of checking managerial conflicts of interest, stakeholders are more, not less, interested than diversified 
stockholders in ensuring managerial fidelity to corporate success, rather than personal enrichment, be it financial or 
on some other dimension. 
101 E.g., Bebchuk, Kastiel, & Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, supra note 18 (showing that top 
corporate managers did not use constituency statutes to protect employees or communities of operation, but did use 
the leverage to benefit stockholders and themselves); Jonathan M. Karpoff & Michael D. Wittry, Institution and 
Legal Context in Natural Experiments:  The Case of State Antitakeover Laws, 73 J. FIN. 657 (2018) (finding no 
measurable difference in outcomes for companies under constituency statutes than companies that were not ). 
102 Rock, supra note 1, at 25. 
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Even more importantly, Senator Warren’s solutions to the problems she 
identifies reflect her deeper recognition that the legal architecture of corporate law 
has not kept up with market developments that have made institutional investors 
and corporate interests much more powerful, and weakened workers and other 
corporate stakeholders.  Whether one agrees with Senator Warren or not, it is 
undeniable that she has identified policy solutions that take into account the way 
corporate law actually works. 
For the moment, just focus on her support of the public benefit corporation 
(“PBC”) model.  The PBC model builds on the business judgment rule model by 
protecting the board from a challenge to a decision that it makes that requires it to 
balance the interests of various stakeholders, including in a sale of the corporation.  
By this means, the PBC model puts a brake on the ability of stockholders to use 
litigation to put pressure on boards to take actions that harm stakeholders to 
generate greater returns for stockholders. 
But the PBC model Senator Warren supports also builds on traditional 
corporate law techniques by imposing a mandatory, normative duty on directors to 
respect all stakeholders.  The duty is not optional or discretionary, it is mandatory.  
But similar to Caremark, the duty is primarily one that is influential because most 
people take duties seriously and try to fulfill them, even if there is no likelihood of 
being punished for failing to do so.  And like Caremark, most PBC statutes, 
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including Delaware’s, create the potential for a suit to enforce the board’s duty to 
stakeholders, even if not by means of monetary liability.103  PBC statutes also 
require the articulation of a corporate purpose and goals, and the publication of 
reports tracking the company’s compliance with its purpose and progress toward 
its goals. 
Interestingly, the benefit corporation model has critics from both 
managerialist stakeholder advocates and from those committed to stockholder-first 
governance.  For stakeholder advocates of the managerialist camp, they advance 
two primary arguments.  First, they argue that realists like Professor Rock just 
don’t recognize that Delaware law is just like laws in the 33 states that took 
express statutory action to be different than Delaware.104  That is, they engage in 
wish fulfillment and denial of objective legal reality.  Second, and more quietly but 
undeniably, these stakeholder advocates are in fact managerialists who do not 
support requiring corporate directors to govern in a manner that respects 
stakeholders, even if that requirement does not expose the directors to any threat of 
monetary liability.  These managerialists are stuck at “may,” and wish to give 
                                                 
103 8 Del. C. § 367 (providing for suits for injunctive and declaratory relief only to enforce directors’ duties to 
stakeholders); id. § 102(b)(7) (allowing corporations to limit the personal liability of directors in certain suits). 
104 Bebchuk, Kastiel, & Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, supra note 18 (finding 33 states with 
constituency statutes in force during the period from 2000 to 2019). 
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boards and CEOs (subject solely to stockholder power) the discretion to protect 
stakeholders to the extent they choose and are able to do so. 
Opponents from a stockholder perspective have a more principled basis for 
opposition.  They believe that boards have no legitimacy to focus on issues other 
than making profits within the bounds of law, and they tend to think that, even in 
the current era, there is too much slack from the discipline of the stock market. 
For someone in the American tradition of evolutionary progress and realism, 
both sets of critics may be thought misguided.  The managerialists fail to address 
the reality that corporate directors are elected by only one constituency, and that 
therefore many statutes unaccompanied by more have not worked.  The 
stockholder advocates ignore that undeniable potency of capital and product 
markets and the way they have tilted corporate governance.105  Perhaps most 
importantly, the stockholder advocates also ignore that most stockholders are not 
long one company, but rather long the entire economy, and thus suffer 
economically if externalities are rewarded instead of sustainable wealth creation. 
The PBC model evolves American corporate law in a way consistent with its 
traditions.  Stockholders retain potent protections and the ultimate ability to elect 
new directors and to reject transactions they do not like.  But the model addresses 
                                                 
105 For a balanced view of the potent interaction of activists and institutional investors and their combined power to 
hold companies’ feet to the fire, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door:  The Impact of Hedge 
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016). 
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the profound change in market power developments by building on the business 
judgment rule to give directors more space to govern in a way that is fair to other 
stakeholders.  And it goes further by requiring the directors to in fact do so if they 
wish to live up to their legal duties.  By both means, it builds on successful 
intuitions and approaches taken historically by American corporate law. 
The model thus works no fundamental revolution, but is instead a 
responsible evolution, insufficient in itself, but useful nonetheless.  And its 
balanced and incremental nature reduces the fear that Professor Rock expresses in 
his pessimistic close that positive change risks more harm than it promises good. 
Not only that, most PBC advocates also support action that would greatly 
minimize any fear that corporate managers could use their duty toward 
stakeholders to impose their own political views on society using corporate 
resources.  First, within the PBC model itself, the focus is not on politics, it is on a 
corporation making profits in a manner that is fair to all stakeholders and that does 
no harm to society.  Most PBCs have positive purposes connected to their business 
model, few if any of which involve hotly contested ideological issues.  Second, and 
more important, advocates of the PBC model like Senator Warren also support 
what a supermajority of Americans do—restricting corporate political spending.106 
                                                 
106 See Strine, Fiduciary Blind Spot, supra note 85, at 1023–24 (collecting poll data showing strong and durable 
bipartisan support for overturning Citizens United and restricting corporate political spending). 
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If corporations were restricted to only making political expenditures under 
plans approved by a supermajority of stockholders, as proposed initially by 
conservative John Bogle in the wake of Citizens United and included in 
progressive Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act,107 the current use of 
corporate funds for political purposes would plummet to previous levels, and the 
practical ability of managers of public companies to misuse a duty to stakeholders 
to pursue their own political hobbyhorses would greatly diminish over what 
happens now in corporations operating under Delaware law and “may” 
constituency statutes.  That is, there would be less danger that stockholders with 
diverse views would see their entrusted capital used to fund candidates and causes 
they do not agree upon,108 and that are contrary to the interests of diversified 
investors.109 
                                                 
107 John C. Bogle, The Supreme Court Had Its Say:  Now Let Shareholders Decide, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/K6YC-K45X; Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 8(b) (2018). 
108 Many corporate law scholars, including strong stockholder primacists, have long believed that corporations have 
no legitimacy to spend corporate funds on politics without express stockholder approval.  Strine, Corporate Power 
Ratchet, supra note 12, at 444 n.81 (gathering writings to this effect by Victor Brudney, John Coates, Lucian 
Bebchuk, Robert Jackson, Benjamin Sachs, and Adam Winkler); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Jonathan R. Macey, 
Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 451 (conservative and liberal writing together and 
embracing this view). 
109 For important scholarship suggesting that corporate political spending unauthorized by stockholders is likely to 
disadvantage diversified investors, see John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and 
After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIR. LEGAL STUDIES 657 (2012); Jay Kesten, Shareholder Political Primacy, 10 VA. 
BUS. L & BUS. REV. 161 (2006). 
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If corporations were less able to pollute our politics, the ability of corporate 
managers to act in illegitimate ways goes way down.110  For example, laws restrict 
charities from participating in politics, and most charities as a result address issues 
on which there is little societal divide.  Even more important, corporate 
stakeholders like employees and creditors have even less interest than diversified 
investors in letting management pursue hobbyhorses that hurt corporate 
performance.  Employees need the company to be profitable to have the chance to 
keep a job and get raises and promotions.  Creditors want to be repaid.  Thus, 
governance focused on stakeholders is not an authorization for management to do 
what it wants, it is a mandate for management to run a profitable company in a way 
that respects all stakeholders and benefits, not harms, society.  Lastly, the 
continued entrustment of the only voting rights to stockholders, and their ability to 
throw out management, plus the disciplining effect of product markets, acts as a 
powerful check on frolics and detours by managers of public companies. 
Interestingly, and relevant to the point of who is being blinkered, is the too-
narrow focus of Professor Rock’s last question, which in my view gets the closest 
to the heart of the debate.  That question asks “what are the social roles and 
                                                 
110 As is known, what is known about corporate political spending is outweighed by what is not known, and what is 
known is troubling enough.  Strine, Fiduciary Blind Spot, supra note 85, at 1027-29 (documenting the concerns 
about leading organizations devoted to tracking such spending that it is impossible to do so and that much spending 
is funneled through dark committees with no money trail for investors or the public to follow). 
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obligations of large publicly traded firms?”111  But those pushing for genuine 
stakeholder-focused corporate governance reform think the question is a broader 
one and understand that with developments in the markets, such as the rise of 
private equity and the ability to finance huge private companies, addressing the 
obligations of public companies is not enough.  From just an investor perspective, 
many Americans are exposed to the risks of private companies as pensioners, and 
as constituents of organizations like universities and charities, because pension 
funds and the nonprofit sector invest hundreds of billions of dollars indirectly in 
private companies through investment-fund intermediaries.  As importantly, 
Americans are workers at these companies, live in communities where they operate 
and often seek tax subsidies, consume products and services they deliver, and thus 
suffer in these capacities if these companies do not fairly treat their workers, their 
communities of operation, the environment, their consumers, and their creditors.  
In fact, it is these companies that are the least constrained in how they use 
corporate resources to act on our political system and in their ability to externalize 
costs.  The concentrated ownership of their shares largely gets to do what it wants, 
and as private companies, they are exempt from reporting to the public even on 
their EESG impact. 
                                                 
111 Rock, supra note 1, at 1, 6. 
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To address these concerns, Senator Warren calls for all companies with over 
one billion dollars in revenues112 to become PBCs and to have a duty to all 
stakeholders and to avoid causing harm to society.113  Others, including me, believe 
it is time that societally important private companies be subject to mandatory 
employee, environmental, social, and governance or EESG reporting that would be 
focused on how these companies treat their workers, the environments, consumers, 
and society, so that they are more accountable on these dimensions and there is not 
a perverse incentive to go private to escape the need to report and thus an 
                                                 
112 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 2(2)(A)(iii) (2018) (providing scope of act).  As Professor 
Rock notes, there is a diversity of entity types.  Rock, supra note 1, at 28.  The Accountable Capitalism Act is 
designed to address not just corporations, but all societally important companies regardless of whether they embrace 
an alternative entity model.  See Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 2(2) (2018) (providing scope 
of act). 
113 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).  I favor a uniform move toward the PBC model, 
but believe it should not involve a new corporate form, but instead require societally influential corporations to 
become a PBC under provisions such as those in the Delaware PBC statute, from which Senator Warren draws in 
her bill.  That is, the federal government should impose a mandate for PBC governance, but companies should be 
chartered under complying state PBC statutes, not an inefficient and unnecessary federal system of chartering.  
Robert G. Eccles, Leo E. Strine, & Timothy Youmans, Purpose With Meaning: A Practical Way Forward, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (May 16, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/16/purpose-with-meaning-a-
practical-way-forward/ (“Under Delaware’s leading statute allowing corporations to adopt that model, benefit 
corporations must have a statement of purpose, and act with due regard to society, the environment, and all 
corporate stakeholders. . . . The model is conservative in that it does not give other stakeholders enforcement rights 
but depends on the existence of stockholders who give real weight to social responsibility and respect for other 
stakeholders.  And the model preserves the strong protections against managerial self-dealing essential to all 
stakeholders.”); Leo E. Strine Jr. & Joey Zwillinger, What Milton Friedman Missed About Social Inequality, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/10/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-inequality.html 
(“To reverse the Friedman paradigm, companies should embrace an affirmative duty to stakeholders and society. 
This requires tangible, publicly articulated goals, such as paying living wages to their workers, respecting workers’ 
right to join a union, promoting racial and gender inclusion and pay equity, enhancing safety protocols, and reducing 
carbon emissions.”); Colin Mayer, Leo E. Strine, Jr., & Jaap Winter, 50 Years Later, Milton Friedman’s 
Shareholder Doctrine Is Dead, FORTUNE (Sept. 13, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/09/13/milton-friedman-
anniversary-business-purpose/ (proposing this approach).  This approach is not only much more likely to become 
law, it is far more likely to be efficient and effective. 
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unintentional blinding of us to more information about EESG by requiring public 
companies alone to report more information on that subject. 
Likewise, there is an increasing recognition that more responsibility needs to 
be imposed on institutional investors themselves to set high standards of 
stewardship around EESG, and to expect sustainable and ethical business practices 
from the companies, private or public, in which they invest.114  Many of these 
investors want more track record and EESG information from hedge and private 
equity funds and private companies, and public officials are taking an increasing 
interest in addressing the outdated public-private divide.115  And there is 
corresponding interest in addressing the pressures activists and private equity exert 
on our corporate governance system, as a result of “going private” and activist 
campaigns that have resulted in harm to workers, creditors, and communities. 
Nor are these stakeholder advocates blind to the reality that revitalized 
external regulation is essential to restoring a fair American economy.  These 
advocates are also leading proponents of measures to breathe life back into the 
                                                 
114 A great citizen of our republic and incisive commentator on corporate governance, Vanguard’s founder, Jack 
Bogle, was quicker than many to realize the need for institutional investor responsibility to be at the forefront of any 
agenda to make our system of corporate governance function more effectively.  John C. Bogle, Reflections on 
“Toward Common Sense and Common Ground,” 33 J. CORP. L. 31 (2007). 
115 The Accountable Capitalism Act, for example, targets all companies with more than one billion dollars in 
revenues, and the Brokaw and Stop Wall Street Looting Acts address activism and private equity.  Brokaw Act, S. 
1744, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing to enhance Rule 13d to require more disclosure by activist investors); Stop 
Wall Street Looting Act, S. 3848, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing regulation of private equity to limit ability to take 
funds out of portfolio, to impose more exposure to liability to injured stakeholders, and to require more disclosure). 
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NLRA116; to pass living wage legislation117; increase consumer protection118; 
address climate change; and create jobs and sustainable prosperity by investing in 
clean infrastructure and new technologies.119  But they are open-eyed to the related 
reality that without addressing corporate power and how it is used, the prospects 
for this external regulation being adopted and being allowed to operate are less 
robust.120 
Of course, some might say, Strine, aren’t you ignoring the call to have 
workers elected directors to large company boards?121  Isn’t that a move toward, 
                                                 
116 Protecting The Right To Organize Act, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2019); Employer Free Choice Act of 2016, H.R. 
5000, 114th Cong. (2016). 
117 E.g., Raise the Wage Act, H.R. 582, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing phased in increase of minimum wage to $15 
per hour). 
118 Senator Warren famously urged the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  See also Forced 
Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, S. 610, 116th Cong. (2019) (limiting ability to force workers, consumers, and 
others to arbitrate their claims); Comprehensive CREDIT Act of 2019, H.R. 3621, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing 
thorough reform to protect financial consumers).  
119 For example, the stakeholder-advocate Business and Society Program at the Aspen Institute has repeatedly called 
for action along these, including in its most recent comprehensive proposal.  See THE ASPEN INST., AMERICAN 
PROSPERITY PROJECT:  A NONPARTISAN FRAMEWORK FOR LONG-TERM INVESTMENT 5–6 (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2017/01/American-Prosperity-Project_Policy-Framework_FINAL-
1.3.17.pdf?_ga=2.8079153.2023942180.1607570649-161828295.1607570649. 
120 E.g., Brokaw Act, S. 1744, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing to enhance Rule 13d to require more disclosure by 
activist investors); Stop Wall Street Looting Act, S. 3848, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing regulation of private 
equity to limit ability to take funds out of portfolio, to impose more exposure to liability to injured stakeholders, and 
require more disclosure); Do No Harm Act of 2019, S. 593, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing to amend RFRA to 
address the negative effect of the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision on employee rights); Inclusive Prosperity 
Act of 2019, S. 1587, 116th Cong. (2019) (financial transactions tax proposal); Wall Street Tax Act of 2019, S. 647, 
116th Cong. (2019) (another FTT proposal); Shareholders United Act of 2019, H.R. 936, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(requiring corporations to survey stockholders annually before engaging in political spending, in reaction to Citizens 
United); Carried Interest. Fairness Act of 2019, H.R. 1735, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing to eliminate the carried 
interest preference). 
121 Rock, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that the Accountable Capitalism Act would require that employees elect at least 
40% of the board); Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6(b)(1) (2018).  More recently, U.S. 
Senator Tammy Baldwin announced legislation to reverse a Trump Administration rule that would discourage 
ERISA plans from voting their proxies unless the plans set a default voting policy to always vote with management, 
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well, “socialism.”  Well, yes, I do not view the call for that small slice of co-
determination as yet central to the debate.  Without political conditions allowing 
for the passage of labor law reform, living wage, the creation of a mandatory board 
committee addressing worker fair pay and safety, and racial and gender equity, and 
other legislation that would support a system of board-level co-determination, not 
only is that sort of system not likely to pass, it will not function as it should.122  
More likely in the immediate term are more realistic moves, as have been 
discussed, that have substantial bipartisan appeal and that are more evolutionary.  
But, I won’t blanch at addressing the socialist issue.  No serious person would 
equate European Social Democratic nations like Germany and Sweden that have 
co-determination with communism, or a system where the government owns the 
means of production.  These are the nations with the companies from whom rich 
Americans buy high-precision cars, watches, and other products.  They have high 
functioning “market economies,” but ones that in the fully realized spirit of the 
New Deal include workers more fully in the governance of the capitalist 
                                                 
saying it would help give workers “their rightful voice in board rooms.”  U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin Announces 
New Legislation to Reverse Trump Administration Move to Silence Workers in Corporate America, TAMMY 
BALDWIN UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR WISCONSIN (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-
releases/baldwin-announces-empowers-act. 
122 In a forthcoming article, my co-authors and I consider in detail the need for greater worker voice, and the 
distance between where we are now and a system of effective ground-up, and not just top-down, codetermination 
that would work in the American context.  See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Aneil Kovvali, & Oluwatomi O. Williams, Lifting 
Labor’s Voice:  A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice and Power Within American Corporate 
Governance (forthcoming).   
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companies for which they work.123  And Americans might remember that the 
United States advocated for the strengthening of European co-determination in the 
wake of World War II, as a bulwark against both fascism and communism.  It was 
the New Deal and European Social Democracy that ultimately defeated both 
fascism and communism.124 
Indeed, it is in the spirit of FDR that 21st Century New Dealers are acting on 
many fronts to press for realistic change to make our economy work better for the 
many.  To echo Roosevelt himself, I believe we have less to fear from moving in a 
direction that will make our economy more like that which exists in high 
functioning societies like those in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Germany, 
than risking a return to the benighted, unequal world of the pre-New Deal — a 
world that created inequality and instability that fueled the rise of fascism and 
                                                 
123 The tendency of American-based scholars, even those with origins outside our borders, to become U.S.–centric is 
illustrated in the current debate about whether stakeholder-focused corporate governance can work effectively.  E.g., 
Bebchuk & Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, supra note 99 (analyzing the expected 
consequences of stakeholder capitalism and concluding that it would not benefit stakeholders).  To be candid, there 
should be no debate.  A majority of EU nations, for example, have a form of stakeholder-focused corporate 
governance, and many of them embrace co-determination, including in the high-functioning Scandinavian and 
German economies.  Ewan McGaughey, Votes at Work in Britain: Shareholder Monopolisation and the ‘Single 
Channel’, 47 INDUS. L. J. 76, 79 n.17 (2018) (noting that 16 out of 28 EU member states have codetermination 
laws); Patricia Crifo & Antoine Rebérioux, Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: A typology 
of OECD Countries, 5 J. Gov. & Reg. 14, 16–17 (2016) (showing that the stakeholder governance model dominates 
in Europe).  And many other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) nations with 
well-performing economies have corporate laws that embrace a stakeholder model.  Id. at 17 tbl. 3 (showing that 
most OECD countries adopt a stakeholder model). 
124 Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR. BUDGET POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Jan. 13, 2020) (“The years from the end of World War II into the 1970s were ones of substantial 
economic growth and broadly shared prosperity.”); The Productivity-Pay Gap, supra note 65 (“[F]rom the late 
1940s to the early 1970s, incomes across the distribution scale grew at nearly the same pace.”); Anne Appelbaum, 
The Lure of Western Europe, 66 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (2019) (discussing the widespread prosperity that flowed in 
the European social democratic nations during the “trente glorieuses”). 
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communism.  The risks that creates for more economic, racial and ethnic division, 
and of also becoming a more corrupt society like Russia,125 are the ones we face if 
we hew to a model of corporate governance built for a different time with 
substantially different power dynamics.  I’ll take the much less troubling risks that 
flow from having corporate governance reform do its fair share in the larger effort 
to becoming a nation that again makes a market economy spread prosperity 
broadly, and this time one that does so durably for black people this time.126 
 
                                                 
125 See Coates, Corporate Speech & The First Amendment, supra note 37, at 224 (discussing the risks of becoming 
Russia if corporate rent seeking rather than fundamental economic innovation in products and services quality 
grows). 
126 Black Americans were locked out of the full benefits of the New Deal on many levels, but economic racial 
inequality still shrunk considerably, particularly after the Civil Rights Revolution and Great Society legislation 
opened the doors of opportunity for Black people wider and built on the New Deal’s leveling effect.  Since the so-
called “Reagan Revolution” against the New Deal and Great Society, racial inequality in income and wealth has 
grown considerably, instead of shrinking.  See supra notes 63, 65, 67.  The reader interested in the mixed legacy of 
the New Deal for black people and the progress made during the Great Society era should not miss IRA K. 
KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE (W.W. Norton 2005); IRA K. KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF:  
THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR Time (Liveright 2013); JOSHUA ZEITZ, BUILDING THE GREAT SOCIETY; 
INSIDE LBJ’S WHITE HOUSE (Random House/Penguin, 2018). 
